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The European Convention and Human Rights
in Northern Ireland
by David R. Lowry* and Robert J. Spjut**
In this article, the authors explore the implications of a Bill of Rights upon the
civil turmoil in Northern Ireland today, with particular attention to the institutions
necessary for the successful implementation of civil libertarian ideals. Specifically, the
authors examine the critical problem of maintaining public order in a society divided
by the subversive activities of extremists, while at the same time working toward an
eclipse of the social and economic inequalities from which violence has issued. It is the
contention of the authors that the adoption of the European Convention on Human
Rights as a bill of rights for the province would not suffice to ensure sustained progress
toward achieving civil liberty, political cooperation, and ultimately social and
economic equality.
M ORE THAN EIGHT years have elapsed since the Northern
Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) began its campaign to
secure civil rights for the Catholic minority in that province., Part of
that campaign was the enactment of a Bill of Rights for Northern
Ireland, one which would have restricted the executive and legislative
powers of the Northern Ireland (Stormont) Parliament.2 As events
escalated, the United Kingdom Parliament abolished the Northern
Ireland (Stornont) Parliament and established direct rule' as the first
phase of securing a constitutional settlement acceptable to the minority
community. The campaign for a Bill of Rights has continued, and it
* Lecturer in Law, School of Law, University of Warwick; presently Associate
Professor, University of Toledo College of Law.
* * Lecturer in Law, Department of Law, University of Kent; presently Associate
Professor, University of San Diego School of Law.
I For a brief account of the origin of the civil rights campaign, see SUNDAY
TIMES INSIGHT TEAM, ULSTER 27-112 (1972) [hereinafter cited as ULSTER]; K. BOYLE,
T. HADDEN, & P. HILLYARD, LAW AND STATE: THE CASE OF NORTHERN IRELAND 6-36
(1975) [hereinafter cited as P. HILLYARD].
2 Several attempts were made to introduce a Bill of Rights into both the House
of Lords and the House of Commons at Westminister between 1969 and 1975. For a
commentary on these abortive efforts, see NORTHERN IRELAND CIVIL RIGHTS ASSOCIA-
TION, BILL OF RIGHTS 1-4 (1975).
3 Northern Ireland (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1972, c. 22. For a survey of the
early effects of direct rule, see Palley, The Evolution, Disintegration and Possible
Reconstruction of the Northern Ireland Constitution, 1 ANGLO-AMERICAN L. REV.
368, 445 (1972).
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has generally been accepted by all political parties in the province 4 and
by the United Kingdom Government' that the constitutional settlement
must include a Bill of Rights.6 However, the form and substance of a
Northern Ireland Bill of Rights is unclear. The standing Advisory
Commission on Human Rights in Northern Ireland has been examin-
ing this issue for more than two years, 7 and there is an emerging con-
sensus that the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms" provides the best prototype. In
this article we shall examine the key problems in the fields of public
order, subversion, and emergency powers with a view to demonstrating
why the apparent consensus over the European Convention ignores
some fundamental questions which have not been resolved satisfactori-
ly. It is our view that the European Convention does not, of itself, pro-
vide any solution to the unique problems of Northern Ireland and,
consequently, makes no substantial contribution to the establishment
of harmony and stability in Northern Ireland.
I. THE CAMPAIGN FOR A BILL OF RIGHTS
A. From 1968 to 1973
Prior to the 1960's the Catholic community abstained from par-
ticipation in the political and constitutional affairs of Northern
Ireland9 because, in part, many desired and believed that the union
between Northern Ireland and Great Britain might be dissolved either
by the United Kingdom Parliament or by a civil war in Ireland.10
NORTHERN IRELAND CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION REPORT 124-41 (1975).
Statement by Mr. M. Rees, M.P., Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, in
894 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th Ser.) 887-88 (1975).
6 COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER, IN THE CONTEXT OF CIVIL LIBERTIES AND HUMAN
RIGHTS, MEASURES TO DEAL WITH TERRORISM IN NORTHERN IRELAND, REPORT, CMND.
No. 5847, at 8 (1975).
' The Standing Advisory Commission was established by the Northern Ireland
Constitution Act, 1973, c. 36, § 20. See STANDING ADVISORY COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1974-75, H.C. 632 (1975); STANDING ADVISORY COMMIS-
SION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, A BILL OF RIGHTS: A DISCUSSION PAPER (Mar. 5, 1976).
a CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL
FREEDOMS, CMND. No. 2894 (1950). On the apparent acceptance of the European Con-
vention as a model for Britain, see P. WALLINGTON & J. MCBRIDE, CIVIL LIBERTIES
AND A BILL OF RIGHTS 7-41 (1976).
9 For a note on the significance of abstentionism, see J. BELL, THE SECRET AR-
MY: A HISTORY OF THE I.R.A. 417-36 (1970).
10 For a note on the temporary nature of the 1920 Northern Ireland settlement,
see H. CALVERT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN NORTHERN IRELAND 34-49 (1968); and
Palley, supra note 3, at 368-88.
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There were periodic I.R.A. (Irish Republican Army) military cam-
paigns against the Royal Ulster Constabulary along the border between
the Republic and Northern Ireland." At the same time, the policy of
abstentionism was undoubtedly fostered by the politically weak position
of the minority community who could not secure a majority of the
seats in the Northern Ireland Parliament.' 2 This numerical weakness
was exacerbated by the concerted discriminatory measures of successive
Unionist Governments, utilizing a range of legal measures to ger-
rymander the parliamentary and local government constituencies
perpetuating the Unionist majority.'" Furthermore, public employment
and private employers-that is, owners of the major industries in the
province -discriminated against Catholics. This resulted in continued
Catholic emigration, which thereby ensured that Catholics remained
numerically an electoral minority.1 4
In the early 1960's, changes in the politics and economy of the
Republic and Northern Ireland created the social and economic con-
text for the civil rights movement of the latter years of the decade.'"
11 See J. BELL, supra note 9, in which a full account is given of the various
I.R.A. guerrilla campaigns up to 1969. The I.R.A. campaign of 1956-62 was the last
border war waged in the context of absentionism of the Nationalist minority and the
absolutist rule by the Unionists.
1" R. ROSE, GOVERNING WITHOUT CONSENSUS: AN IRISH PERSPECTIVE 93-101
(1971). See ULSTER, supra note 1, at 33-39.
1 Indeed, the Commission of Inquiry chaired by Lord Cameron found that
Unionists in 1969 "did not contest" the fact that electoral boundaries had been ger-
rymandered. See REPORT ON DISTURBANCES IN NORTHERN IRELAND, CMND. No. 532,
esp. at 134-42, 229 (1969) [hereinafter cited as CAMERON REPORT].
14 D. BARRITT & C. CARTER, THE NORTHERN IRELAND PROBLEM: A STUDY IN
GROUP RELATIONS (1962). The authors record that between 1951 and 1961, 51,000
Catholics emigrated - compared to 41,000 Protestants - notwithstanding the fact
that Catholics constituted only one-third of the total population of Northern Ireland.
Id. at 107-08. In R. ROSE, supra note 12, at 366, the author deduces that emigration
is the most significant regulator of the proportion of Catholics to Protestants in Nor-
thern Ireland. See also M. FARRELL, NORTHERN IRELAND: THE ORANGE STATE (1976).
11 For a full analysis of the political changes, demonstrating a shift from a
pastoral economy supplemented by traditional industries such as ship-building, to a
diversified capital-intensive economy emphasizing textiles and light engineering, see M.
FARRELL, supra note 14. This era coincided with the acceptance of the idea of a plan-
ned economy, and several Stormont inquiries presaged a new concern with regional
planning and industrial development. For a note on the 1963 Mathew Plan and the
1965 Wilson Plan, see Palley, supra note 3, at 433-34. See also NORTHERN IRELAND
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME 1970-75, CMND. No. 547 (1970); and REVIEW OF
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND, CMND. No. 564 (1971).
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The shipyards and linen firms, which were the traditional, Protestant
owned industries, were declining while foreign investment was playing
an increasing role in economic development in the North. i" The
multinational firms did not need to discriminate against the Catholics,
and the basis of Unionism gradually was being undermined." In the
South, the indigenous developing industrialists had not secured a posi-
tion in the British or European markets and foreign investment also
provided the stimulus for the economic growth. In the North, the pro-
spect that the Catholic middle class would develop protected industries
in a United Eire was also disappearing, as was the basis of Na-
tionalism. Finally, the border which hitherto had provided economic
protection to the Northern and Republican industrialists now preclud-
ed fruitful investment and trade which was being attracted by the
economic potential in the deprived and underdeveloped areas near the
border.
Another major change was the establishment of the welfare state in
Northern Ireland.' Prior to the second world war, high unemploy-
ment among Catholics ensured not only a high rate of emigration, 9
but also entrenched the marginal privileges of Protestant employees
who, although they received average wages lower than their counter-
parts in Britain, nonetheless earned a stable income and were allocated
public housing.20 As the minority community received social welfare
benefits, the necessity to emigrate was ameliorated, permitting more
people to remain in the province and to seek periodic employment.
More importantly, since the welfare benefits were in parity with those
in Britain, the privileges of Protestant workers were considerably erod-
ed. The Catholics received a level of benefits which provided sub-
sistence without the necessity of employment, while the Protestant
16 See M. FARRELL, supra note 14, at 227-56.
11 On the effect of foreign investment on entrenched patterns of employment
discrimination, see E. MCCANN, WAR AND AN IRISH TOWN 211-12 (1974).
11 Although the devolved Stormont Parliament possessed legislative competence
in matters of social welfare, and the Unionist Party had allied with the British Conser-
vative Party in Westminister to oppose various welfare enactments, the Northern Irish
Unionist government eventually decided to enact its own parallel social welfare pro-
gram. However, subsequent amending social welfare legislation at Westminister was
not followed automatically by similar legislation at Stormont. M. FARRELL, supra note
14, at 214.
19 See D. BARRITT & C. CARTER, supra note 14.
20 For a detailed exposition of the privileged position of the Protestant working
class in Northern Ireland and the relationship between Protestant employees and the
Unionist Party, see G. BELL, THE PROTESTANTS OF ULSTER (1976).
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employees worked at wages slightly above that level. 2' As the social and
economic consequences of unemployment among Catholics decreased,
Protestant resentment correspondingly increased. 22
These fundamental changes transformed the Catholic community
in Northern Ireland. First, the potential for securing positions as
employees and managers in foreign firms in Northern Ireland raised
the expectation that Catholics could and should receive their propor-
tionate share of the wealth generated in the province. The traditional
Catholic minority view that justice could only be secured by unifying
the six counties of Northern Ireland with the Republic to the south
became an aspiration instead of an immediate goal, the primary aim
becoming social justice in the north."s Second, the relative security
provided by the welfare state fostered a climate of expectation that the
Northern Ireland Government should distribute that justice fairly.
Consequently, Catholic attention was directed towards securing it from
the Unionists who had enjoyed uninterrupted rule. The desire,
however, to participate in Northern Irish politics was paradoxical. As a
minority they had little hope that the Nationalist Party would secure a
majority of the seats in the Northern Ireland Parliament and, hence,
would initiate the necessary legislation to establish civil rights. Par-
ticipation in the Stormont Parliament offered little hope of success,
especially if the Unionist Government continued to perpetuate Protes-
tant supremacy. At the same time, abstentionism offered no hope of
calling parliamentary attention to their inferior position. In short, the
2' See id. at 17-33.
2 In retrospect, this often inarticulate resentment explains the attraction of Pro-
testant workers to the increasingly strident and sectarian utterances of the Reverend
Ian Paisley. Paisley increased his influence and importance during an era in which
workers in the traditional, prestigious, and relatively more lucrative skill categories
became more insecure because the Protestant Unionist state was unable to maintain
the margin of relative economic and social privilege. Thus, the thrust of Paisley's in-
vocations for a return to established Protestant values and protection of Ulster Protes-
tant culture and heritage held considerable significance for the threatened Protestant
working class. See G. BELL, supra note 20, at 26-33. For a critical biography of Paisley
see P. MARRINAN, PAISLEY: MAN OF WRATH (1973). .
23 The early civil rights campaigners went to considerable lengths to exclude
discussion of the border and eschewed irredqntist philosophy as irrelevant to the task of
obtaining equality and social justice within Northern Ireland. This inevitably led to
the collapse of the Nationalist opposition party. The tensions between the irredentists
and the orthodox civil rights campaigners have been recorded graphically by a former
civil rights leader in Londonderry. See E. MCCANN, supra note 17, at 27-74. See also
ULSTER, supra note 1, at 45-58.
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Nationalist Party had no prospect of initiating or pressuring the
Unionist Government to effect necessary changes.24
The other alternative for initiating constitutional reform was non-
violent extra-parliamentary campaigning which, by drawing public at-
tention to the issues, would have initiated the debate for reform and
brought pressure to bear on the Unionist Governments. Such a cam-
paign was at first organized by the Campaign for Social Justice (CSJ) in
1963.25 The CSJ organized civil disobedience to test the will of the
Unionists and to enlighten the public.2 6 Later, when a campaign was
organized throughout the province and led by prominent members of
NICRA,27 marches and public meetings were used to protest against
the discriminatory policies of the Unionist Government. Some of the
campaigners, perhaps superficially informed of the United States
Supreme Court's activist role in stimulating desegregation in the
United States, endeavored to initiate legislative reform through test
cases in the courts. There was no prospect of success. First, there is no
tradition in the United Kingdom of the involvement of the legal pro-
fession or judiciary in political issues.28 Second, the judges in Northern
Ireland were appointed by hostile Unionist Governments.2 9 In fact, this
strategy did fail.30 Eventually the United Kingdom Government, faced
24 See E. MCCANN, supra note 17, and L. DE PAOR, DIVIDED ULSTER 148-49
(1970).
21 P. HILLYARD, supra note 1, at 11; R. ROSE, supra note 12, at 100-06.
16 See L. DE PAOR. supra note 24, at 166-68, and CAMERON REPORT. supra note
13, at 26.
2? For a brief account of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA)
in organising and leading nonviolent protest, see R. ROSE, supra note 12, at 156-62.
For a critical view of NICRA's role, see E. MCCANN, supra note 17, at 27-74.
28 See generally S. DE SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW chs. 2
& 3 (2d ed. 1973).
29 For an interesting survey of the political antecedents of the Northern Irish
judiciary, see A. BOYD, HOLY WAR IN BELFAST 192 (1969). See also Miller, The
Orange Judiciary, HIBERNIA REV., Jan. 16, 1976, at 6.
30 The most significant test case was McEldowney v. Forde, [1969] 3 W.L.R.
179, in which the House of Lords, by a policy of judicial abnegation, refused to review
the use of Reg. No. 42, STAT. R. & 0. N.I. (1967), by Mr. William Craig, the Nor-
thern Irish Home Affairs Minister, to ban an opposition political party (Republican
Clubs). The House of Lords was unwilling to challenge ministerial discretion in the
absence of proof of mala fides, which had not been alleged. For a description of fur-
ther abortive efforts to seek redress in the courts by civil rights campaigners, see Car-
roll, The Search for Justice in Northern Ireland, 6 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 28
(1973). See also P. HILLYARD, supra note 1, at 6-25, in which the authors show that
the failure of judicial review closed another major avenue of protest, and that judicial
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with escalating disorder which ensued from the confrontation between
the civil rights marchers, on one hand, and the Unionist Government
and Protestant extremists,"' on the other, abandoned the convention of
non-interference in Northern Irish affairs,3 2 and pressure was brought
to bear upon the Unionist Governments to initiate major constitutional
reform .33
The civil rights campaign did more than enlighten the public in
Britain about Unionist discrimination: it asserted minority rights of
participation in the constitutional and political process. In the provin-
cial politics, the monolithic Unionist Party was threatened in its
monopolistic control of the legislative process by this assertion.
Unionist toleration of the marches inevitably meant recognizing the
legitimacy, if not the Catholic position on the issues. The solidarity
between Protestant workers and the elite in the Unionist Party was sus-
tained by the marginal privileges distributed to the former. Unless the
Unionists could preserve these, that solidarity eventually would be
undermined. The minority demands for democratic rights to initiate
reform also posed a serious threat to the Unionist solidarity. Because
preservation of Unionism meant denial of this extra-parliamentary
political power, the Unionist Home Affairs Ministers endeavored to
suppress the civil rights movement as contrary to public order.
unresponsiveness may have hastened the advent of civil disobedience and street
demonstrations.
" See ULSTER, supra note 1, at 78-79, and L. DE PAOR, supra note 24, at
160-63.
31 A highly illuminating account of the United Kingdom Government's attitude,
understanding, and approach to the emerging Northern Irish crisis is contained in J.
CALLAGHAN. A HOUSE DIVIDED: THE DILEMMA OF NORTHERN IRELAND (1973). (As
Home Secretary, Mr. Callaghan carried Cabinet responsibility for Northern Ireland up
to June 1970). See also ULSTER, supra note 1. On constitutional change and the man-
ner of British involvement, see Palley, supra note 3, at 406-18.
Is The pressure by the United Kingdom Government culminated in a meeting
between the Premier of Northern Ireland, J. Chichester-Clark, and the British Prime
Minister, Harold Wilson. The result of this meeting was a joint declaration which, in-
ter alia, affirmed equality of treatment for all in Northern Ireland. See NORTHERN
IRELAND: TEXT OF A COMMUNIQUE AND DECLARATION ISSUED AFTER A MEETING HELD
AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON AUGUST 19, 1969, CMND. No. 4154 (1969). Unfortunately,
this declaration was produced only after serious rioting and use of the army to restore
order. It did not speak to the timing of the implementation of reforms. Had the
declaration appeared one or two years before 1969 it might have had some utility in
de-escalating the conflict. See also P. HILLYARD, supra note 1, at 15-19, and J.
CALLAGHAN, supra note 32, at 62-63, 189-92.
1978]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association included in its cam-
paign for civil rights a demand for the establishment of a Bill of
Rights in the province. In 1969 such a Bill was envisaged as serving
both positive and negative functions.3 4 By enacting into law the basic
rights and freedoms of the individual, there would be a statutory
declaration of civil rights from which the courts could not retreat.
Moreover, the campaign, through judicial proceedings, could compel
the courts to impugn the discriminatory and repressive laws of the
Unionist Government. It was hoped that the Stormont Parliatnent
would be forced to initiate the necessary liberal legislation. In its
negative function it protected basic civil liberties from repressive
measures and liberal legislation from repeal. The Bill of Rights, while
it might have reformed the laws governing the drawing of constituency
boundaries, never could have secured to the minority the control of
the Stormont Parliament and, thus, could not have transferred
democratic control over the government to the Catholic political par-
ties. Nevertheless, it might have offered protection of the rights of the
minority and granted power to initiate debate over issues concerning
civil liberties and rights.
B. The 1973 Constitutional Settlement
Since the -Northern Ireland Parliament was prorogued by the
United Kingdom Parliament in 1972, the policy of the British Govern-
ment has been the establishment of a developed government which in-
cluded a coalition of the minority parties in the executive. 5 The Social
Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), which principally draws its sup-
port from Catholic voters, rose to new importance in 1972, because of
its role in forming the new government. This is not to suggest that civil
rights lost its significance during this period. Rather, it is to draw at-
tention to the first major Catholic political participation in the initia-
tion of legislation. It had never been seriously suggested that there was
any need to fetter the power of a government in view of the fact that
14 See NORTHERN IRELAND CIVIL RIGHTS ASSOCIATION, supra note 2, at 1-4;
Northern Ireland Bill of Rights, 817 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 384 (1971); Northern
Ireland Bill of Rights, 320 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 538 (1971); Second Reading
Debate, 332 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 531 (1972). See also NORTHERN IRELAND
CIVIL RIGHTS ASSOCIATION, THE FEATHER COMMISSION: OBSTRUCTION TO JUSTICE?
(1976).
36 NORTHERN IRELAND CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS, CMND. No. 5259, at 52
(1973).
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the leading politicians in the SDLP were persons who organized and
led civil rights marches and had suffered the abuses of the police.
3 6
But, by the time that the Unionist Government introduced internment
in August 1971, the SDLP had walked out of the Northern Ireland
Parliament and abstained from further participation." The SDLP con-
tinued to demand an end to internment and the repressive measures
by the British army, the former being a condition to their participa-
tion in discussions about the constitutional settlement.38
The abstention of the SDLP from participation in Northern
Ireland Government ceased in 1973, although the United Kingdom
Government continued to use internment as its principal weapon
against the Provisional I.R.A. 9 The SDLP participated in the new
Northern Ireland Assembly during its formative months and agreed to
form a coalition executive with the moderates in the Unionist Party
and the Alliance Party. In December 1973 they entered into discussion
with the Irish and British Governments, together with the other Ex-
ecutive members to reach an accord over the Council of Ireland, the
institution which hopefully would satisfy the aspirations of those desir-
ing to see some mechanism for the ultimate reunification of the North
and the South. More importantly, the Sunningdale Communique in-
cluded proposals to examine the Royal Ulster Constabulary and
establish a Court of Human Rights,'40 both of which provided some
evidence that the SDLP would not agree to a constitutional settlement
until there was reform of policing and adequate protection of human
36 For descriptive accounts of the less than harmonious workings of the coalition
cabinet, see P. DEVLIN, THE FALL OF THE N.I. EXECUTIVE (1975); and R. FISK, THE
POINT OF No RETURN (1975).
3' See ULSTER, supra note 1, at 258-60, and E. MCCANN, supra note 17, at
89-90.
38 Immediately after the introduction of internment the SDLP called for an in-
tensified campaign of civil .disobedience, announced plans for an alternative assembly
entitled an Assembly of the Northen Irish People, and refused to accept the opposition
benches at Stormont. See 1 R. DEUTSCH & V. MAGOWAN, NORTHERN IRELAND
1968-73: A CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 120, 130, 135 (1973).
39 For a critical commentary on the role of the SDLP, see E. MCCANN, supra
note 17, at 248-50.
40 Statement on Ireland (Tripartite Conference) 866 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.)
28 (1974). This statement is universally known as the Sunningdale Agreement. For a
perspective on events surrounding the Sunningdale Conference and Sunningdale
Agreement, see 2 R. DEUTSCH & V. MAGOWAN, supra note 38, especially at 360-62,
for the Northern Irish response to Sunningdale.
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rights. 4' Nevertheless, whatever may have been thought of the idea of
a coalition executive initially, it became apparent that this institution
was not a sufficient condition for the protection of civil rights and
liberties .2
C. The Constitutional Convention 4
The campaign to establish a Bill of Rights received new life in the
debate preceding the Northern Ireland Constitutional Convention in
the summer of 1975. First, the minority community no longer expected
that the participation of its major party, the SDLP, in the executive
sufficed to protect civil liberties, and there was increased belief that a
Bill of Rights was necessary to fetter any executive in Northern
Ireland. Second, the general strike called by the Ulster Workers' Coun-
cil Co-Ordinating Committee (UWC) demonstrated the power and
temporary solidarity of the Protestant community in their resistance to
the Sunningdale Communique. This opposition has been construed to
extend to coalition government. 44 The extreme Unionist and Loyalist
party politicians established their dominance in the Protestant com-
munity, reducing the moderate Unionists, who were willing to par-
ticipate in the coalition executive, to a small rump party. 45 There
seemed a strong possibility that the British Government might abandon
its policy that executive power had to be shared by both Protestant
and Catholic parties, and that the Stormont Parliament might be re-
The Sunningdale Agreement speaks only of the proposed Council of Ireland
being "invited to consider" whether the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms might be enacted into domestic legislation. 2 R. DEUTSCH &
V. MAGOWAN, supra note 38, at 360-62.
42 In fact, the Northern Irish Executive and Assembly were unable to agree upon
the establishment of the Council of Ireland proposed in the Sunningdale Agreement;
consequently, the European Convention was not examined.
43 See THE NORTHERN IRELAND CONSTITUTION, CMND. No. 5675 (1974). The
Constitutional Convention was established pursuant to powers contained in the Nor-
them Ireland Act, 1974, c. 28, sched. 2.
4 On the role of the U.W.C. and its use of a general strike to bring down the
power-sharing coalition, see R. FISK, supra note 36. For a contemporaneous analysis of
these events, see WORKERS ASSOCIATION, THE ULSTER GENERAL STRIKE (1974).
4' In the Convention Elections the pro-coalition Unionists were reduced to 7.7%
of the votes cast and only five seats. For a full breakdown of voting figures and pat-
terns under the method of proportional representation used in the election, see R.
ROSE, NORTHERN IRELAND: TIME OF CHOICE 97, 171-72 (1976); and I. McAllister, The
1975 Northern Ireland Convention Election, University of Strathclyde Occasional
Paper No. 14, Survey Research Centre, Glasgow, 1975.
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established.4 6 The Republican Clubs were among a small section of the
province which would accept majority rule, provided that a Bill of
Rights was also enacted. 4 7 The need for a Bill of Rights seemed the
only measure to protect the minority from a traditional form of intran-
sigent Unionist Government.
The general strike of May 1974, organized by the UWC,
demonstrated the power and initative of the Protestant paramilitary
organizations. In the year that followed, they endeavored to protect
that power from encroachment by the political parties which had com-
bined to form the United Ulster Unionist Council (UUUC).48 Tradi-
tionally, the extreme Unionist politicians of the Unionist Party and the
Orange Order provided exclusive leadership in the Protestant com-
munity, but in the wake of the general strike the paramilitary
organization, particularly the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and
the UWC strike council, assumed that leadership. 49 During the next
46 R. ROSE, supra note 45, at 139-68, explains the several options open to the
British Government.
41 Republican Clubs are the political wing of the official I.R.A., which declared
a truce in June 1972 and has not resumed fighting. During the 1960's Republican
Clubs gradually moved away from the abstentionist philosophy and shifted to the
political left, causing the traditionalist Republicans to split off forming the Provisional
I.R.A. As Republican Clubs moved gradually to the left, embracing Marxist
philosophy, they began to engage in parliamentary and extra-parliamentary politics.
Today the Republican Clubs are identified with the politics of the Communist Party.
Both the Republican Clubs and the Communist Parties of Britain and Ireland have
long favored a Bill of Rights. See also 2 R. DEUSCH & V. MAGOWAN, supra note 38, at
250; and C. GREAvES, THE IRISH CRISIS 196-201 (1972). Greaves, an Irish Marxist
theoretician, gives extensive arguments in favor of a Bill of Rights as part of a settle-
ment. Id. at 197-201. On the ideological split between the Official and Provisional
wings of the Republican movement, see C. O'BRIEN, STATES OF IRELAND (1972), and
S. MACSTIOFAIN, MEMOIRS OF A REVOLUTIONARY (1975).
48 The Ulster Citizens Civil Liberties Association (UCCLA), which had been
established under the auspices of the most powerful Protestant paramilitary group, the
UDA, not only favored a Bill of Rights but published its own draft in June 1975. See
ULSTER CITIZENS CIVIL LIBERTIES ASSOCIATION, A PROPOSED BILL OF RIGHTS FOR THE
UNITED KINGDOM (1975).
4 Yet another "umbrella" loyalist political organisation was formed late in 1974,
namely, the Ulster Loyalists Central Coordinating Committee. This organisation com-
prised both the paramilitary and political leadership of the extremist Protestant Com-
munity. It was useful to the political leadership because it guaranteed them access to
and influence over the now powerful paramilitary organisations. On the other hand,
this new organisation symbolized the newly found importance of the Protestant
paramilitary groups and ensured access for them to political policy-making councils. In
this way Protestant paramilitary agencies have been able to frustrate the trend towards
1978]
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year the traditional Protestant leadership struggled to regain its prom-
inence. The UWC and the UDA for the first time recognized the need
for legal protection against a government formed by the UUUC. 50
The Constitutional Convention failed to produce an agreement bet-
ween the SDLP and the UUUC; consequently the secondary issues, in-
cluding a Bill of Rights, received little attention. The Convention
Report refers to the varying views of the political parties, including
those favoring the enactment of the European Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as the Bill of
Rights. s" The UUUC did not accept this suggestion but did recom-
mend that a Bill of Constitutional Rights and Duties be included in
the new constitution, without detailed explanation of the form and
substance to this proposal.5 2 This ambiguity belies a fundamental
disagreement on certain issues as yet unexplored in the political debate
in Northern Ireland.
The Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights, chaired by
Lord Feather, has stepped into the vacuum left by the collapse of the
Convention and has provided a forum for debate. Prior to the Conven-
tion, the Advisory Commission announced that it was examining the
question of whether a Bill of Rights was necessary, and if so, what
form it should take. s After the Convention was terminated, the Ad-
visory Commission continued its investigation, receiving evidence from
a wide range of organizations. The debate was stimulated by the sug-
gestion of eminent judges in England that there should be a constitu-
compromise or pragmatism which had, on occasions, enabled some Protestant
politicans to seek a political solution to the Constitutional problem in Northern
Ireland. See Kelleher, Who's Who in the U. W.C., HIBERNIA REV., June 7, 1974, at 5.
50 Significantly the UDA, by far the strongest and most influential Protestant
paramilitary organization, strongly supported the UCCLA draft Bill of Rights. Support
from Loyalist political parties remained unkown. Thus, the Convention Report, which
wholly reflected the views of the Protestant UUUC majority politicians, contains only a
vauge reference to a Bill of "Constitutional Rights and Duties." It is suggested here
that the majority Protestant politicians were not anxious to advance a proposal which
might circumscribe the notion of absolute majority rule, whereas, the Protestant
paramilitary organisations envisaged entrenched protection against all future political
leadership, including Protestant majority devolved government at Stormont.
61 All minority political parties, all civil rights organisations, all paramilitary
organizations except the Provisional I.R.A., and all trade unions had long been on
record as supporting a Bill of Rights as a part of a constitutional settlement.
11 NORTHERN IRELAND CONSTITUTIONAL REPORT 141 (1975).
63 Probe Into Ulster Bias, Belfast Telegraph, June 6, 1974, at 1; and Feather
Denies Casual Approach, Belfast Telegraph, May 10, 1975, at 1.
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tional settlement in the United Kingdom that included a Bill of
Rights. 5 4 The Northern Ireland Secretary, Mr. Rees, added his im-
primatur to the debate by stating in the House of Commons that a Bill
of Rights would be included in a constitutional settlement in Northern
Ireland. s
Notwithstanding the general agreement that there should be a Bill
of Rights for Northern Ireland, there has been virtually no literature
which examines the important underlying issues. 6 It is essential that
there be a serious and substantial investigation of these questions if an
agreement is to be reached. Without such an examination, the consen-
sus lacks substance.5 7 The following examines the function of a Bill of
Rights in the key areas of public order, subversion, and emergency
powers in light of a possible devolution to Northern Ireland of powers
excluding jurisdiction over criminals and the enforcement of public
order. In addition, these key areas will be scrutinized in the light of a
complete devolution of power to a Northern Irish legislature.
II. DEVOLVED GOVERNMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND
Until recently, proponents of the Bill of Rights have envisaged the
bill restricted to a devolved parliament in Northern Ireland - that is,
preventing the ultra vires exercise of power by regional government.
More recently, however, there has been a suggestion that this Bill of
s4 L. SCARMAN, ENGLISH LAW-THE NEW DIMENSION (1974); Hailsham, The
British Institution, The Times (London), May 12, 16, 19, and 20, 1975; Address by
Sir Arthur James, The Holdsworth Club, Birmingham, 1976.
894 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 888 (1975).
p. WALLINGTON & J. MCBRIDE, supra note 8, offer a survey of some of the
more readily apparent issues relating to a Bill of Rights but do not carry forward a
thorough examination of underlying policy and theoretical matters.
s1 Examples of the failure to adequately define the issues inherent in a Bill of
Rights are now plentiful. See, e.g., Address by Sir Keith Joseph, Conservative Political
Centre Conference (Jan. 26, 1975); G. Hutchinson, Now is the Time for a Bill of
Rights, The Times (London), Aug. 7, 1976; S. Hastings, Time To United Against
Marxism, Daily Telegraph, Jun. 24, 1975 Editorial, Required-A Bill of Rights, The
Spectator, Aug. 7, 1976; J. Griffiths, Whose Bill of Rights, New Statesman, Nov. 14,
1975; J. Jacob, Say No to a Bill of Rights, Tribune, Feb. 6, 1976; Editorial, A British
Bill of Rights, The Guardian, Dec. 16, 1975. Even a cursory examination of the
writings of the contemporary proponents of a Bill, of Rights strongly implies that agree-
ment cannot be reached without settling for rights defined on a very general level. In
this way, deeper issues of principle may be avoided; consequently, the European Con-
vention on Human Rights which is both general and declaratory, may be an attractive
model for a variety of pragmatic political groups and parties.
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Rights should restrict the powers of the United Kingdom Parliament as
well. The failure of the Northern Ireland Constitutional Convention to
produce an agreement has led to the prolongation of direct rule for an
indefinite period. Some see advantages in the United Kingdom
Parliament's enacting legislation which establishes a Bill of Rights even
though it is unclear whether it would restrict the United Kingdom
Parliament's sovereignty. Many have been led to this position, having
been deprived of their civil liberties by the British Army during the
period of direct rule. As a result, they have reached an understanding
that the United Kingdom Government poses no less a threat to their
civil liberties than a developed government does.
A. United Kingdom Government
In the absence of a constitutional settlement, there is no advantage
to the United Kingdom Parliament's enacting a Bill of Rights in North-
ern Ireland which purports to fetter exclusively the powers of the
United Kingdom Government. At present it is difficult to conceive of
the courts accepting the proposition that Parliament can entrench a
Bill of Rights so as to include provisions which would prevent a subse-
quent Parliament from amending or repealing the Act. 8 It is unlikely,
therefore, that a judicial proceeding which might be instituted by pro-
ponents of civil rights would provide any successes, not to mention
confidence in either the Bill of Rights or the judiciary. More impor-
tantly, it is generally supposed that a Bill of Rights, by emphasizing
the basic principles of fundamental freedom, will engender an at-
mosphere of respect for civil liberty. Unfortunately, recent events in
Northern Ireland indicate that sectarian divisions prevail over respect
for human rights. The Bill of Rights, moreover, by applying exclusive-
ly to Northern Ireland, would exclude that section of the population in
Great Britain sympathetic to those who critically resist the govern-
ment's measures abrogating civil liberty.5 9 While there is an abstract
11 Under the general rule of parliamentary sovereignty, Parliament cannot
deprive itself of power to legislate on any matter or otherwise predetermine the future
content of its own legislation. See Ellen Street Estates Ltd. v. Minister of Health,
[1934] 1 K.B. 590, and Vauxhall Estates Ltd. v. Liverpool Corp., [1932] 1 K.B. 733.
See also S. DE SMITH, supra note 28, at 74-75. But see D. KEIR & F. LAWSON, CASES IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7 (4th ed. 1954), in which the authors argue that skilled draft-
ing could entrench an act by providing that repeal of a provision would have no effect
unless approved in a referendum. This argument was, however, omitted from the cur-
rent edition (5th ed. 1967).
59 For example, residents of Great Britain who oppose British military-security
policy in Northern Ireland would remain subject to constraints on freedom of move-
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understanding of what constitutes civil liberties in Great Britain, those
who seek to protect these ideals have failed to persuade both the
Government and the population at large that the erosion of liberty in
Northern Ireland is intolerable even in the circumstances of civil unrest
in that province. British civil libertarians have been impotent and prob-
ably will continue to be unable to mobilize the population to pressure
the Government to reduce its emergency measures. The successes in
this regard, such as the termination of internment, are attributable to
the civil rights campaigners within the province. Furthermore, civil
libertarians in Northern Ireland are unlikely to increase either their
political stature or their effectiveness in that province through such a
Bill of Rights if they remain unable to provide legal action which im-
pugns the action of the United Kingdom Government. Consequently,
such a measure will add little to their present campaign.
B. Devolved Government
There are two fundamentally distinct forms of devolved govern-
ment which must be considered: that established by the Government of
Ireland Act (1920)60 and that established by the Northern Ireland
Constitution Act (1973).61 Under the former a wide range of powers
were devolved, including the general power to enact laws for the
"peace, order and good government of Northern Ireland. ' 62 There
were also powers to make laws for the administration of police, public
order and criminal law. 63 Under the Act of 1973, there was a modified
general grant of power under which the Assembly could enact
measures.6 4 Moreover, the Assembly was not authorized to enact
ment, assembly, association, expression, and to restricted due process of law under the
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1976, c. 8. For an examination
of the effect of this legislation on British pressure groups, see NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR
CIVIL LIBERTIES, PREVENTION OF TERRORISM: A REPORT ON THE FIRST FOUR MONTHS
OPERATION OF THE ACT (1975). For the alienating effects on the Irish immigrant com-
munity in England, see M. Maher, The Irish in London: A Vauge Sense of Threat,
The Irish Times (Dublin), May 25, 1976, at 14.
60 The Government of Ireland Act, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 67 (1920). For a full ex-
amination of the form of devolved government conferred by this statute, see N.
MANSERGH, THE GOVERNMENT OF NORTHERN IRELAND: A STUDY IN DEVOLUTION
(1936, Newark, The Law and the Constitution, in ULSTER UNDER HOME RULE (T.
Wilson ed. 1955); and H. CALVERT, supra note 10.
61 The Northern Ireland Constitution Act, 1973, c. 36. For an examination of
the 1973 Act, see B. NARAIN, PUBLIC LAW IN NORTHERN IRELAND 417 (1975).
62 The Government of Irleand Act, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 67, § 4(1) (1920).
63 Id.
64 The Northern Ireland Constitution Act, 1973, c. 36, § 4(1).
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measures in the controversial areas of policing, security, criminal law,
public order, electoral law, subversion and terrorism.6"
In the introduction to this article we identified the campaign for
the Bill of Rights with the struggle of the Catholic community to con-
stitutionally entrench and legally protect its extra-parliamentary power
to initiate the debate over civil rights issues. This remains the focal
point of analysis concerning the efficiency of a Bill of Rights. The ma-
jor governmental interests that justify restriction of these rights are
public order, subversion, and emergency powers. Thus, these matters
are the principal area of our examination. If the legislative and ex-
ecutive powers over these crucial areas are retained by the United
Kingdom Parliament, there is little to be achieved in contending that
there should be a Bill of Rights in Northern Ireland. It is more to the
point to suggest desired reforms in these critical areas and campaign
for speedy statutory implementation. On the other hand, if these
powers are transferred to a Northern Ireland Government, then a Bill
of Rights will substantially restrict that Government's exercise of these
powers.
C. Majority Rule or Coalition Government
There is one other fundamental distinction between the devolved
constitutional governments under the Acts of 1920 and 1973; there was
a majority cabinet government under the former, whereas there was a
coalition executive under the latter.6 6 Under the Act of 1920 the hopes
of the minority community to share in the process of initiating legisla-
tion were bleak. First, although the Unionist Party was in theory open
to Catholic membership,6 7 it was closely connected to and dominated
by the Orange Order, an organization which stands for the perpetua-
tion of Protestant supremacy.6 8 It is most unlikely that a Catholic could
ever secure a high position in that party, not to mention in a Unionist
Government.6 9 Second, the inability of the population to establish a
61 Id. sched. 3.
66 Id. § 2(1)(b); The Government of Ireland Act, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 67, § 8
(1920).
67 For a detailed history of the Unionist party, see J. HARBINSON, THE ULSTER
UNIONIST PARTY: 1882-1973 (1973).
68 For historical evaluations of the role of the Orange Order in Northern Ireland,
see M. FARRELL, supra note 14, and G. BELL, supra note 20.
69 The Unionist Party never nominated or elected a Catholic candidate to Stor-
mont. In the 1969 general election a Unionist Association in County Down, in a major
cause celebre, preferred not to contest the constituency rather than nominate a
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new party (perhaps along the lines of a labor party), not exclusively
identified with either religious community, has proved to be im-
possible.70 The civil rights movement, which began without political
party affiliation or identification or exclusive support from the
Catholics, 71 was almost immediately condemned by extremist Unionists
who made political capital out of the presence of Catholics in the
movement. 72 Other parties, such as the Labour and Alliance parties,
have failed to secure more than nominal support in the province and
are unlikely to increase membership or support in the foreseeable
future.73 In the present polarized situation in Northern Ireland, the
minority community is unlikely ever to command more than a substan-
tial minority of the seats in an assembly or parliament. 74 If the Act of
1920 is adopted as the model for future devolved government in the
province, then Catholics are unlikely to realize democratic control over
the legislative process. If the constitutional settlement is to effect a
democratic solution, a Bill of Rights is insufficient. It is evident that
what a coalition government can achieve is a necessary condition to the
attainment of the goal of civil libertarians.
It is important to note that a coalition government in Northern
Ireland ensures neither stability nor liberalism in that province. As we
observed in the introduction, the participation of the SDLP in the ex-
Catholic local resident who had joined the Unionist Party. See R. ROSE, supra note 12,
at 224. The Unionist Party remained silent throughout the public outcry. See A.
BOYD, BRIAN FAULKNER AND THE CRISIS OF ULSTER UNIONSIM 38 (1972).
70 Various attempts have been made to form non-sectarian parties such as the
Northern Ireland Labour Party, the New Ulster Movement, and the Alliance Party.
None have met with more than transient success. See R. ROSE, supra note 12.
71 On the non-sectarian nature of the initial civil rights campaign, see CAMERON
REPORT, supra note 13, at 56-61, 185-228.
71 See L. DE PAOR, supra note 24, at 169-205. Mr. William Craig, then the
Minister of Home Affiars, described the civil rights movement in 1968 as "bogus and
made up of people who see in unrest, a chance to renew a campaign of violence,"
cited in ULSTER, supra note 1, at 47. This view was later examined and dismissed by
the Commission of Inquiry, chaired by Lord Cameron, supra note 13, at 218-46.
71 For an examination of the marriage of party allegience and regime allegiance,
see R. ROSE, supra note 12, at 218-46.
11" This particular view has been accepted by both Conservative and Labour
Governments in Westminister since 1972 and has led to the conclusion that "power
sharing" or coalition would be necessary if the minority was ever to achieve an interest
in political power. For an examination of the British view that "no constitution can be
established in Northern Ireland that is not acceptable to the bulk of the parties to the
dispute," see R. ROSE. supra note 45, at 64.
1978]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
ecutive, created under the Act of 1973, did not result in a termination
of internment nor even in the vitiation of the repressive measures being
executed by the police and army against the minority population.
There is no evidence to indicate that a coalition government will of
necessity lead to respect for civil liberties in the province. Thus, it
seems that the campaign for a Bill of Rights is justified in continuing
to seek a protection of fundamental rights even if a coalition govern-
ment is finally established in Northern Ireland. It is important also to
note that coalition experiments in Cyprus and Lebanon have not
secured constitutional stability. In the light of recent events there is no
reason to assume that such stability will automatically be secured in
Northern Ireland. If the crisis which the province has experienced
since 1968 should not abate, the skeptic has reason to doubt that coali-
tion government will be sufficient to preserve the political stability of
devolved government.
III. PUBLIC ORDER
The fundamental principle underlying political liberties, which in-
clude freedom of expression, assembly and association, must be briefly
explained to enable the reader to fully appreciate the public order prob-
lem in Northern Ireland. In the classic exposition of civil liberty, John
Stuart Mill grounded his theory upon the premises that men are vir-
tuous, and that the principal virtue is tolerance.7 5 This proposition was
crucial to his conception of liberty, which was not merely a license for
self-regarding action, but was necessary for the production of divergent
opinions.76 Only through the harmonious competition of opposing and
conflicting ideas could truth emerge, and this individual conflict con-
stituted the engine of progress of civilized man.77 Although individuals
might be transigent in their opposition to the views of others, the vir-
tue of tolerance in governing the response dictated the sanguine ex-
7' J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY ch. 2 (1956) (1st ed. London 1859).
76 Id.
77 There is the greatest difference between pressuring an opinion to be true
because, with every opportunity for contesting it, it has not been refuted, and
assuming its truth for the purpose of not permitting its refutation. Complete
liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion is the very condition
which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of action; and on no
other terms can a being with human faculties have any rational assurance of
being right.
Id. at 24. See also id. ch. 5.
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amination of the arguments of the opposition, or at least that such ex-
amination should be permitted by society.7" At the same time, Mill
recognized that liberty to express opinions might be abused by the pro-
pagandist, but nevertheless he did not deem it appropriate that such
propagation might be legitimately suppressed; rather, competition of
ideas should be trusted to expose the abuses.7 9
In the realm of action Mill formulated a more restrictive view of
the realm of liberty by distinguishing "self-regarding" from "other-
regarding" action, the latter being taken out of the "province of liber-
ty." 80 Although the individual was completely free to act when his
endeavour was "purely self-regarding," he interfered with the rights of
others when there was a "definite damage" or a "definite risk of
damage" either "to an individual or to the public." The Millian con-
ception of public order includes in the first instances those cases where
individual action actually violates another's rights or those of the
public, and in the second, where there is a risk of such damage. Un-
fortunately, Mill never clearly enunciated what was meant by damage
to the public, and the boundaries of his conception of liberty remain
vague. He did say, however, that where a speaker expresses his opinion
in circumstances which provoke his audience, this positive instigation is
other-regarding and outside the bounds of liberty.81
This classical liberal notion of the public order encounters serious
difficulty when applied to Northern Ireland. In the case of public
meetings and demonstrations, which upon analysis are found to con-
78 The usefulness of an opinion is itself matter of opinion-as disputable, as
open to discussion, and requiring discussion as much as the opinion itself....
And in point of fact, when the law or public feeling do not permit the truth
of an opinion to be disputed, they are just as little tolerant of a denial of its
usefulness. The utmost they allow is an extenuation of its absolute necessity,
or of the positive guilt of rejecting it.
Id. at 27-28. See also ch. 4.
19 Id. at 64.
80 Id. ch. 4.
1 "No person ought to be punished simply for being drunk; but a soldier or a
policeman should be punished for being drunk on duty. Whenever, in short, there is a
definite damage or a definite risk of damage, either to an individual or to the public,
the case is taken out of the province of liberty and placed in that or morality or law."
Id. at 99-100. "No one pretends that actions should be as free as opinions. On the con-
trary, even opinions lose their immunity when the circumstances in which they are ex-
pressed are such as to constitute the expression of a positive instigation to some
mischievous act." Id. at 67.
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stitute a form of extra-parliamentary political power, the public order
problem is acute. On the one hand, they reflect not only the expres-
sion of new ideas, but also stimulate public debate and progress in
civilized society. On the other hand, they threaten to "instigate" the
minority and to "damage" the current distribution of political power
and certain vested interests in that arrangement. They will be perceiv-
ed thereby as damaging the "public." Unless those who control the in-
itiation of legislation are both willing and able to introduce progressive
reforms, the distribution of political power obstructs rather than fur-
thers progress. In Northern Ireland the evidence is abundantly clear
that the Unionists, until they were pressured by the British Govern-
ment, s 2 obstructed progressive reform. In order to impede the in-
itiatives taken in the minority community, the Unionists used the law
to repress civil rights activities contrary to the public order.8 3
The inconsistency in the classical liberal position also extends to
Mill's limitation on liberty that where there is a "risk" of damage, the
action is taken out of the province of liberty. In its narrowest sense,
the "risk" of damage might mean the imminent prospect of self-
regarding action becoming other-regarding; therefore, action to avert
the damage is jusified. The degree of proximity and remoteness is
dependent upon numerous factors, so-that a society in peril of immi-
nent attack from a foreign enemy or overthrow by internal subversives
poses a "risk" that wholly depends upon a theory of society. Further-
more, Mill recognizes that preventive police power is necessary to avert
the damage and, hence, that tolerance must be restricted in accord-
ance with what the organization of that society can, in its own view,
afford to "risk." 84 This is especially the case where a section of society
advocates that there should be an overthrow and abolition of the
government. In Northern Ireland such tolerance was very limited
under the successive Unionist Governments.
The classical liberal conception of public order, although con-
troversial and certainly far from clear, may extend to what Edmund
82 Even after the Downing Street Declaration, supra note 33, was put into various
reform statutes it remained largely unenforced. For an account of the shift in Unionist
tactics, see A. BOYD, supra note 69, at ch. 8.
83 For a descriptive analysis of the abuse of public order powers to repress dis-
sent, see THE SCARMAN REPORT, VIOLENCE AND CIVIL DISTURBANCES IN NORTHERN
IRELAND IN 1969, CMND. No. 566 (1972).
84 J.S. MILL, supra note 75, at 116-22.
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Burke 85 and current writers describe as subversion.8 6 What Burke
discovered in the French Revolution many contemporaries now find
parallel in the Bolshevik Revolution and in the spreading acceptance
of socialism.87 First, the philosophy which guided the revolutionaries in
France-employing reason to reconstruct the social order-was alien to
that which was accepted in Europe and, more importantly, suggested
to Burke that the traditional institutions, including the aristocratic
ownership of property, should be abolished.88 Second, the revolu-
tionaries were organized, and they had sympathizers in other countries
who found in the Revolution the potential for radical reform in their
countries. 89 Finally, through their appeal to the masses, the revolu-
tionaries found not only that their philosophy was gaining acceptance,
but that they created a following which enabled them to take direct
action to overthrow the older order. 90 Burke continually denounced
these activities as subversive, althugh his description lost currency in
the 19th century. Nevertheless, in a society where there are persons
fomenting rebellion, as was the case in Northern Ireland, then what
Burke described as subversion certainly constitutes a problem for the
maintenance of the "public" order.
a Burke's descriptions of the French Revolution as subversive are numerous. See
E. BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (1969) (1st ed. 1790)
[hereinafter cited as REFLECTIONS]; Remarks on the Policy of the Allies with Respect
to France (1793), in 4 WORKS 467 (J. Nimmo ed. 1896) [hereinafter cited as WORKS];
Letter to Florimond-Claude, Comte de Mercy-Argenteau (Aug. 6, 1973), in 7 THE
CORRESPONDENCE OF EDMUND BURKE 386 (P. Marshall & J. Woods eds. 1968); and
Letter to Rev. Thomas Hussey (Feb. 4, 1795), in 8 id. at 136.
88 Auerbach, The Communist Control Act of 1954: A Proposed Legal-Political
Theory of Free Speech, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 173 (1956); Marshall, The Defense of
Public Education From Subversion, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 587 (1957); Newhouse, The
Constitution and International Agreements or Unilateral Action Curbing "Peace-
Imperiling" Propaganda," 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 506 (1966).
87 See O'Brien, Introduction to E. BURKE, REFLECTIONS, supra note 85, at 56;
and A. BAUMAN, BURKE: THE FOUNDER OF CONSERVATISM (1929).
88 REFLECTIONS, supra note 85, at 149-53, 172, 202. For Burke's treatment of
this proposition, see An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs (1791), in 4 WORKS,
supra note 85, at 68.
89 Thoughts on French Affairs (1791), in 4 WORKS, supra note 85, at 317.
90 REFLECTIONS, supra note 85, at 121-31. Burke described the appeal as corrup-
tion of the masses. A Letter to a Member of the French National Assembly (1791), in
4 WORKS, supra note 85, at 10-11, 30-31.
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The maintenance of public order poses two fundamentally distinct
issues, and in the discussion of Northern Ireland it is imperative that
these be treated separately. On the one hand, there is the potential for
riots which arises out of public meetings and processions conducted by
Protestants and Catholics alike. The requirement here is the necessary
balance of toleration by both communities, on the one hand, and the
prospect of incitement and provocation on the other. We shall ex-
amine those issues in this section under the rubric "public order." On
the other hand, there is the continual campaign by the minority com-
munity, although its organization and tactics may vary widely during
history, to reunify the North with the Republic of Ireland. We shall
examine that particular problem as one of subversion.
A. Incitement and Provocation
In his chapter on the right of public meeting, Dicey generally ac-
cepted the rule that the freedom to hold public meetings included the
corollary that those who endeavor to disturb that meeting do not
render the exercise of the right illegal. The underlying principle,
therefore, is that "a meeting otherwise in every respect lawful and
peaceable" must be tolerated by the public, and the hostility of per-
sons opposed to the meeting must not be sanctioned by the law. 91
However, Dicey did limit the principle in one very important respect:
where the meeting "may be held to cause a breach of the peace"
because it is of a kind "which naturally provokes the opponents". 92
Dicey's example is relevant because it is that of a Protestant speaker
holding a meeting in an area inhabited by a large Roman Catholic
population, and the speech is "slanderous" of the latter. 93 Here, says
Dicey, "the object of the meeting is not strictly lawful, and may
therefore excite opponents to a breach of the peace. ' 94 What renders
the meeting "not strictly lawful" is the fact that the speaker, cognizant
of the tension between the inhabitants of the area and his listeners, in-
cites the former. Thus, Dicey formulated a concept of provocation as a
restriction upon the right of meetings. His -second limitation was
91 A. DICEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITU-
TION 273 (10th ed. 1959).
92 id. at 277.
95 Wise v. Dunning, [1902] 1 K.B. 167.
'4 A. DICEY, supra note 91, at 277.
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similar, i.e., if the speaker incites his own listeners to breach the
peace, then the meeting is unlawful. 9s
Northern Irish law differed fundamentally from Dicey's rules.
Significantly, there were numerous offenses which might be committed
by a person participating in or organizing a meeting, including the
catch-all provision in the Special Powers Act of 1922-439s which made
it an offense where a person "does any act of such a nature as to be
calculated to be prejudicial to the preservation of the peace or
maintenance of order in Northern Ireland and not specifically provid-
ed for in the regulation." '9 The basic principle that every person
should be able to ascertain his legal rights with certainty was
undeniably abrogated by this provision. 98 Moreover, the Special Powers
Acts of 1922-43 vested in the Civil Authority, in the Minister of Home
Affairs, in the police and the magistrates, powers to ban meetings
which were held in both public and private places on the grounds that
such order was considered necessary for the protection of life, proper-
ty, the preservation of peace or the maintenance of order. 99 As the
91 Id. at 278-79.
96 Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act, 1922, 12 Geo. 5, c. 5 (N.I.); Civil
Authorities (Special Powers) Act, 1928, 18 & 19 Geo. 5, c. 5 (N.I.); Civil Authorities
(Special Powers) Act, 1933, 25 & 24 Geo. 5, c. 12 (N.I.); Civil Authorities (Special
Powers) Act, 1943, 6 & 7 Geo. 6, c. 2 (N.I.).
9, Id. § 2(4).
96 For a discussion of this point, see Edwards, Special Powers in Northern Ireland,
1956 CRIM. L. REv. 7.
" Under the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act, 1922, 12 Geo. 5, c. 5 (N.I.),
the Home Affairs Minister was authorised to delegate powers contained in the Act to a
police officer and to vary or revoke the regulations. First, the Civil Authority was em-
powered to regulate the hours of licensed premises under Reg. 2(1), 1922, 12 Geo. 5,
c. 5 (N.I.); revoked by Reg. No. 147, STAT. R. & 0. N.I. (1949); re-introduced as
Reg. No. 39, STAT. R. & 0. N.I., No. 281 (1969). See also Intoxicating Liquor Act,
1971, c. 51, § 5 (N.I.). Second, the Civil Authority was authorized to prohibit and
restrict meetings in private places by Reg. No. 38A, STAT. R. & 0. N.I., No. 312 (1969).
Third, there were several powers to restrict or prohibit meetings in public places. Reg.
No. 3(1)(a), 1949, 12 Geo. 5, c. 5; revoked by Reg. No. 147, STAT. R. & 0. N.I.
(1949). Regulation 4, 1922, 12 Geo. 5, c. 5 was the most comprehensive provision.
This regulation was amended by Reg. No. 80, STAT. R. & 0. N.I. (1933), and later
revoked by Reg. No. 187, STAT. R. & 0. N.I. (1951). A modified version was in-
troduced as Reg. No. 38, STAT. R. & 0. N.I., No. 173 (1966) and later amended by
Reg. No. 214, STAT. R. & 0. N.I. (1970). Specific power to prohibit meetings near
barracks was provided in Reg. No. 14, 1922, 12 Geo. 5, c. 5; revoked by Reg. No.
187, STAT. R. & 0. N.I. (1951). Finally, there was a power to impose prolonged bans
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rule of law did not apply to these wide powers, there was no legal
mechanism for preventing the discriminatory exercise or arbitrary
abuse of powers. In fact, the Flag and Emblems (Display) Act (NI) of
1954100 provided for a discriminatory exercise of executive powers by
empowering the police to remove provocative emblems-10 while at the
same time making it an offense to threaten interference with the
display of the Union Flag,10 2 which in Northern Ireland is the symbol
of both Unionism and the supremacy of Protestantism. In effect, the
Union flag was a symbol which had to be tolerated by those who, in
Dicey's terms, might be "naturally provoked" while other symbols were
not similarly tolerated.103
The application of the laws provides considerable evidence of the
dual standards found in the Flag and Emblems (Display) Act (NI) of
1954. Intolerance towards Republican symbols is illustrated by the
celebrated incident during the 1964 general election when the police
entered the Falls Road (a Catholic area) in force to remove the display
of a Tricolour flag, thereby provoking a major riot. 10 4 On the other
hand, the attempts to compel minority tolerance of Protestant proces-
sions is amply testified to by the notorious decision of the Unionist
Government to permit the Orange parade of June 30, 1970, through
the Ardyone area (another Catholic residential district), which provok-
ed the leading resident Catholics to riot. 0 5 It was this dual standard
which the Unionist Executive continually applied to the civil right mar-
ches and the extremist Protestant counter demonstrations which in-
evitably resulted in conflict. The role of the Home Affairs Minister,
Mr. Craig, in banning the civil rights march on October 5, 1968, in
on public meetings under Reg. No. 40, STAT. R. & 0. N.I., No. 198 (1970); amended
by Reg. No. 309, STAT. R. & 0. N.I. (1971). Special provision was made for meetings
in the Stormont Estate Regulations, Reg. No. 112, STAT. R. & 0. N.I. (1933). The
Public Order Act, 1951, 15 Geo. 6, c. 19 (N.I.), as amended by the Public Order
(Amendment) Act, 1970, c. 4 (N.I.), established powers to regulate and ban meetings
and processions. For a discussion of these regulations see H. CALVERT, supra note 10,
at 388-89; and Palley, supra note 3, at 404, 434-37.
,00 2 & 3 Eliz. 2, c. 10 (N.I.). For a discussion of this Act see H. CALVERT, supra
note 10, at 389.
101 Flag and Emblems (Display) Act, § 2(1) & (2).
102 Id. § 1.
103 Id. § 2(4).
104 For a succinct account of these events see L. DE PAOR, supra note 24, at 161.
105 See ULSTER, supra note 1, at 205-09. See also I R. DEUTSCH & V. MAGOWAN,
supra note 38, at 66-67.
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Londonderry and permitting the spurious Apprentice Boys parade, was
publicly criticized in the Cameron Report. 0 6
If the minority community is to be accorded the right to conduct
meetings and processions and to display the symbols of their political
aspirations which are essential attributes of the limited power to con-
duct extra-parliamentary campaigns, then three substantial reforms
are necessary. First, there must be clarity and certainty in the laws
which govern these rights - that is, freedom cannot be secured if the
legal position is uncertain. The offenses which may be committed by
those carrying out these activities should be enacted in statute form
and must be clearly and precisely drafted. Second, the concept of prov-
ocation must reflect Dicey's approach, thus requiring two radical
reforms in Northern Ireland: mainly, that the minority community
must be permitted the liberty to display their political symbols and to
conduct their meetings without fear of attack from the Protestant com-
munity; and additionally, the Protestant marches and display of sym-
bols must be confined to Protestant residential areas. We deliberatley
use the words "residential areas" because during the early phases of the
civil rights campaign, which consisted of persons drawn from both the
Catholic and Protestant communities, the marches were identified as
"Catholic" and the city centers where the municipal buildings were
located and which were the focus of the protest, were considered to be
Protestant areas.107 This meant that no non-sectarian movement could
emerge in Northern Ireland, and the function of the public order law
was, therefore, not merely to subjugate the minority population but
also to prevent the emergence of any non-Protestant political group in
opposition to the Unionists. In any event, neutral territory is essential
to establish the equality of the two respective political positions. This
revision of the notion of provocation in Northern Ireland requires that
the responsible authorities - the police and regional government -
be willing and able to confine the Protestants to their areas; and it is
this very suggestion which runs contrary to the essence of Protestant
supremacy. In short, "order" can no longer be a shorthand description
of Protestant supremacy.
Third, the administration of public order laws must be subject to
the rule of law, and the affected communities must have confidence in
the administration of justice. The concept of provocation which must
be established in Northern Ireland must be enacted in general terms
106 CAMERON REPORT, supra note 13, at 11 159-67.
107 Id.
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and the enforcement of that law vested either in the courts or the ex-
ecutive or both. On the one hand, it is possible that the law might im-
pose no prior conditions or restraints upon the exercise of the rights to
freedom of expression, association and assembly, and that those who
cause a breach of the peace might be prosecuted only after the offense
is committed. In the context of Northern Ireland, where the tension
between the two communities provides succor for major sectarian riots,
there is undoubtedly a need to prevent breach. of the peace where
serious disorder will ensue. There is a strong case for providing some
form of prior restraint on the exercise of the right to hold public
meetings and processions. Ideally, there should be provisions, similar
to those found in section 3(1) of the British Public Order of 1936,
although more precisely drafted, which permit the police to impose
conditions upon the public meeting or procession as to time and man-
ner in order to prevent serious public disorder. Those powers should
similarly extend to the flags and emblems which are displayed during
such meeting or procession. Moreover, the decision of the police or ap-
propriate authority should be referred to the Divisional Court for
review.
The scope of judicial review is limited, and in this context where it
does not include a review of findings of fact, these limitations confer a
considerable degree of power upon the appropriate administrative
authority. Such powers might be vested in the Minister of Home Af-
fairs (or some similar officer in a coalition executive) who may impose
conditions in particular cases. The principal control over the exercise
of such Ministerial discretion in such an arrangement is essentially
Ministerial accountability via questions which might be raised in the
Assembly. Such an arrangement inevitably would place the administra-
tion of public order laws into the political party arena of the coalition
government, and if there is considerable tension in the province, it
carries a high potential for precipitating a serious crisis in power shar-
ing. It well may contribute to political instability rather than foster
harmony. Furthermore, in view of the history of Unionist administra-
tion of public order laws, it seems unlikely that the minority communi-
ty will have much confidence in reestablishing Unionist executive
responsibility for public order law. On the other hand, the deeply
embedded Protestant suspicion of Catholic allegiance to the state
makes it most unlikely that Protestants would entrust such responsibili-
ty to a member of the SDLP or other party which draws its political
support from the Catholic community. The prospect of executive
responsibility for the administration of the public order laws in North-
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ern Ireland, at least over the regulation of meetings and processions,
seems unlikely to create a consensus in the provincial government and
more likely to precipitate crises.
Another possibility is to vest responsibility for public order in the
police in Northern Ireland. Specific, controversial decisions would be
the subject of dispute not within the coalition executive, but rather
between the community and the police. By expressly providing that
there shall be judicial review of such decisions, the law becomes the ra-
tional framework for resolving controversial issues. Such a solution
necessarily requires the satisfaction of two conditions; first, the com-
munities must have confidence in the police and, second, they must
have confidence in the judiciary to apply the rule of law in a fair and
non-discriminatory manner. In Northern Ireland, the Royal Ulster
Constabulary undoubtedly is identified by the minority community
with the security of the Unionist governments, and by the Protestants
with the perpetual security of the border between the Republic and
the North.108 The minority community has virtually no confidence that
the R.U.C. will make fair decisions which affect liberties, and it ap-
pears unlikely to develop such respect in the near future. More impor-
tantly, there should be some form of responsibility for the administra-
tion of public order law which is analagous to the accountability of a
Home Affairs Minister, that is, some local political control. It is essen-
tial that there be radical reforms in the administration of policing in
Northern Ireland, perhaps to the extent of community control of the
police.' 0 9 Such localized democratic control would establish the sug-
108 THE SCARMAN REPORT, supra note 83, cited 58 abuses of police power, while
THE CAMERON REPORT, supra note 13, was also critical of the RUC. See also REPORT
OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON POLICE IN NORTHERN IRELAND, CMND. No. 535
(1969); McKeown, RUC in Search of a Role, HIBERNIA REV., Sept. 28, 1975; (At the
time of writing the RUC remains almost wholly Protestant and has been accused of
brutal interrogtion. The current Catholic attitude toward the RUC is that it presents
an insuperable obstacle to normal police practice in Northen Ireland.); REPORT OF THE
ENQUIRY INTO ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THE SECURITY FORCES OF PHYSICAL BRUTALITY
IN NORTHERN IRELAND ARISING OUT OF EVENTS ON THE 9TH AUGUST 1971, CMND.
No. 4823 (1972): REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF PRIVY COUNSELLORS APPOINTED TO
CONSIDER AUTHORISED PROCEDURES FOR INTERROGATION OF PERSONS SUSPECTED OF
TERRORISM, CMND. No. 4901 (1972). The European Commission on Human Rights
recently found the RUC had used torture. The matter has been referred to the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights. REPORT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, IRELAND V. UNITED KINGDOM, Application No. 5310/71 (1976).
109 See B. NARAIN, supra note 61, at 326-27; 3 COMMUNITY FORUM (Belfast), No.
2, at 7-11 (1973).
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gested accountability and contribute to the growth of confidence in the
police and concomitantly in administration of public order laws.
The three conditions which we have outlined above demonstrate
that the protection of the rights of public meeting and procession are
dependent upon the creation or reform of the judicial and executive
institutions responsible for administering public order laws. The Euro-
pean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms in general terms declares, "Everyone has the right to
freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with
others.""10 This establishes in positive law the right, but it does not
guarantee the legal certainty of the public order laws which restrict
those rights. More importantly, that provision is subject to a clause
stipulating a major exception "such as [is] prescribed by law and [is]
necessary in a democratic society for the prevention of disorder,""' but
does not establish the judicial and executive institutions which are
necessary conditions to the acceptable administration of the public
order laws. It is possible that the judicial interpretation of the general
declaration and the exception might lead to a revised concept of pro-
vocation but, as we have seen, that is insufficient in the context of
Northern Ireland. Even the application of the rule of law has proved
inadequate to establish confidence in the executive and police and,
consequently, there is little prospect in the liberal interpretation of the
Bill of Rights unless adequate provision is made to permit participa-
tion in the local control of policing.
In addition to the general provisions of the European Convention,
police reform by establishing local control is required if a solution pro-
tecting the liberties of the minority community is to be achieved. Fur-
thermore, there should be a comprehensive public order code which
contains the offenses which might be committed by persons exercising
their fundamental freedoms and, more importantly, which establishes
the precise powers of the police to restrict the exercise of those rights.
In this way, the rights would be protected with precision and certainty
and, if there is controversy over the exercise of power, the judiciary
can construe the public order law with reference to the general princi-
ple established in the Bill of Rights.
B. Subversion
Although subversion is identified essentially with an organized
endeavor to overthrow the state, it also encompasses the organization
110 Art. 11(i).
M Art. ll(ii).
[Vol. 10:251
NORTHERN IRELAND
of society which that state protects. In Blackstone's Commentaries
subversion is characterized by the activities of the Roman Catholics,
whom Blackstone describes as owing an allegiance to the Pope. 12
There is, therefore, a conflict of loyalty for the Catholics, between the
sovereign of Great Britain and the organized Roman Catholic Church;
and it is incumbent upon the latter to undermine the authority of the
national sovereign. It was Burke's counterrevolutionary genius that
separated this connection between subversion and religion and refor-
mulated the concept of modern society in which the affairs of church
and state are wholly distinct. In its place he substituted the threat of
democracy." 3 Universal suffrage, a fundamental principle declared by
the French Revolution, separated the ownership of property from the
rule of the affairs of state and society, and for Burke this portended
the ignominious deprecation of superiority and inequality which must
be protected and preserved if the institution of private property was to
continue." 4 Thus, Burke was not concerned narrowly with the preser-
vation of the monarchy nor preoccupied with the aristocratic form of
government, but with the organization of society based upon the in-
stitution of private property, and it was the threat to this form of
society that he most vociferously deprecated in his counter-
revolutionary writings.
In the era of classical liberalism, subversion does not receive the
explicit treatment found in the 18th century. For example, Dicey does
not mention the word subversion nor does he appear to formulate an
analagous concept in his discussion of the rights to freedom of discus-
sion or public meetings. As we saw previously in our discussion of
public order, the ambiguous explication of the notion of public order
permits the argument that subversive threats might be properly dealt
with as a "risk" of danger to the public." 5 Nevertheless, this particular
problem was not considered so serious as to warrant explicit treatment
in the discussion of liberty.
In the present century there has been, following the Bolshevik
Revolution, a revival of interest in Burke's writings on subversion, and
these have found their way into the jurisprudential debate over the
nature of the threat. 1 6 In the United States the laws enacted by the
112 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 102-05.
Is Thoughts on French Affairs (1791), in 4 WORKS, supra note 85, at 318-23. See
also Letter to Sir Hercules Langrishe (1792), id. at 257.
114 Id.
115 See note 81 supra and accompanying text.
110 See note 86 supra.
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Federal and State Governments have been principally directed against
the activities of the Communist Party and left wing organizations, and
it is affiliation with the Communist Party in the Soviet Union that has
been identified as the key to the conflict with the citizen's allegiance to
the United States." 7 At the same time, the essence of communism is
the endeavor to mobilize the proletarian overthrow of capitalsim and it
is this aspect of Communist ideology that is equally important to the
program of the left wing parties being characterized as subversive. In
Great Britain, especially in the 1930's, the threat has not been ex-
clusively from the left, but also from the Fascists whose paramilitary
intimidating and provocative marches were proscribed by the Public
Order Act of 1936 and have been identified as subversive."18 In the
case of the latter the uniforms signifying association with the Fascists
were identified with the alien politics of Nazi Germany and, in this
sense, were characterzied as subversive of British democracy.
Article 17 of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which provides that
[n]othing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any
State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform
any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms
set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is pro-
vided for in the Convention" 9
is perhaps one of the two provisions which might be construed as
defining subversion. The other is the provision in the exception clause
of Article 10 which permits restrictions on the right to freedom of ex-
pression in the interest of the territorial intergrity of the state.12 0 If the
words "rights and freedoms set forth herein" in Article 17 are iden-
tified with the creation and protections of those rights in capitalist
society, which is the view that has been taken by the European Com-
mission,' 2 ' then the activities of the Communist Party, so long as it
"I Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S.
298 (1957). See generally Gorfinkel & Mack, Dennis v. United States and the Clear
and Present Danger Rule, 39 CALIF. L. REV. 475 (1951); Richardson, Freedom of Ex-
pression and the Function of Courts, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1951); Chafee, Thirty-Five
Years with Freedom of Speech, I KAN. L. REV. 1 (1952).
"' See I. BROWNLIE, LAW RELATING TO PUBLIC ORDER (1968), for the history
and use of the 1936 Act.
"9 CONVENTION, supra note 8, at art. 17.
110 Id. art. 10(2).
"' German Communist Party v. Federal Republic of Germany, [1957] Y.B. EUR.
CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 222 (Eur. Comm. on Human Rights) (Appl. No. 250/57).
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aims at the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism, also aims at the
destruction of those "rights and freedoms set forth" in the Convention.
In this sense, Article 17 is consistent with the jurisprudential defini-
tions of subversion which have been developed in the United States.
On the other hand, there is no element of allegiance or notion of con-
flicting allegiances found in Article 17, a factor which is easily explain-
ed by the international character of the Convention. Thus, Article 17
represents an innovation in the concept of subversion, linking it ex-
clusively to the organization of society and not in conjunction with the
state as well. At the same time, however, the exception provision in
Article 10 does permit restrictions on freedom of expression in the in-
terest of preserving the territorial integrity of the state. Nevertheless,
that restriction is distinct and does not form part of the anti-subversion
provision and therefore stands on its own.
Once subversion is identified, there is considerable controversy con-
cerning what constitutes the appropriate response. At one extreme is
the tolerant position which contends that the falsity of the ideas being
propagated by the subversives - which is mainly socialism and com-
munism - will be exposed and condemned to impotence by the
critical scrutiny which can take place only if society continues to per-
mit the free exchange of opinions. The other extreme position echoes
the eloquent injunction of Burke against tolerating the continued
chaos produced in France by the Revolution, when he described it as
an "evil in the heart of Europe [which] must be extirpated from that
centre, or no part of the circumference can be free from the mischief
which radiates from it, and which will spread, circle beyond circle, in
spite of all the little defensive precautions which can be employed
against it."122 This extremely intolerant position demands repression of
subversive activities, perhaps even at the costs of war or civil war, for
otherwise the present order must remain condemned to a precarious
existence until it finally crumbles under the corrosive effects of subver-
sion.
It is at this point that we must now return to the ambiguous for-
mulation of the classical liberal conception of public order. On the one
hand, if the political power is so distributed that those in control of
parliamentary power include all sections of society and are capable of
responding to the demands of a particular section, especially where
there is a concerted campaign for constitutional reform, then it is
unlikely that the tension in that society will ever become such that
122 WORKS, supra note 85, at 401.
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there is a substantial risk of a revolutionary overthrow of the govern-
ment. The advocacy of revolution will produce little, if any, support
and, in the terms of classical liberal theory, there is no "risk" of
damage to the public. On the other hand, if the sections of society in
control of the parliament are incapable and unwilling to respond to
the demands which another section is pursuing, and which they
perceive as legitimate for the continued participation in the state, then
the tension produced by the confrontation will lead to the possibility of
a revolutionary overthrow of the state. In classical liberal terms, there
is a "risk" of damage to the public, although there is no inquiry into
the societal structure which creates that "public." In these cir-
cumstances there is the genesis of the United States Supreme Court
doctrine of the "clear and present" danger test to the governmental
suppression of subversive activity. 2 This position, it should be observ-
ed, does not go as far as the Burkian call for repression irrespective of
the magnitude of the costs., It is perhaps this position underlying Arti-
cle 17 which is not conditioned upon there being any form of danger,
unless, of course, there is an assumption that the existence of the pre-
sent organization of society, especially the potential for foment by the
socialist states, constitutes a permanent "clear and present" danger.
The extent to which a government may deprive individuals and
groups of their fundamental freedoms in its suppression of subversive
activities also is a subject of considerable controversy, and the prin-
ciples are not cleary established. First, there are those rights which
permit individuals to mount parliamentary opposition and, possibly,
campaigns to secure control of the legislative and executive powers. In
this area, the government may impose qualifications for electors and
candidates standing for public office. Second, there are those rights
which provide the basis for organizing extra-parliamentary opposition
against the government or its policies. As we have already noted, these
include the rights to freedom of expression, to hold public meetings
and processions, and to associate with others. Here the government
may proscribe the activities of the subversives, thereby depriving them
of the power to organize legitimate extra-parliamentary opposition.
Finally, there are activities which do not fall within the traditional am-
bit of civil liberty, such as employment and trade union activities,
which allow the organization of others into a powerful group, although
23 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Gitlow v. N.Y., 268 U.S. 652
(1925); A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 17-19,
24-27, 47-48 (1948); Chafee, Book Review, 62 HARV. L. REV. 891 (1949).
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this is not necessarily directed towards particular governmental
policies. In this area, governments sometimes apprehensive of the ac-
tivities of leftists have proscribed the participation of subversives or
conditioned their employment upon their loyalty to the state. 24 The
anti-subversion laws are not principally aimed at curtailing the violent
struggle to overthrow the state, but rather at eliminating the power
base upon which any campaign might be organized.
Unionist Governments in Northern Ireland employed a modified
Blackstonian notion of subversion in that nationalism - the establish-
ment of an independent united Irish state - posed the principal
threat to the continued union with Great Britain, but it was rooted in
the Catholic community, which virtually adhered to no other political
view until the 1960's. In this sense, the Protestants, including leading
members of the Unionist Governments, identified the Catholics as be-
ing bound by two allegiances which undermined their obligatory loyal-
ty to the Northern Ireland Government. First, there was their subser-
vience to the papal edicts of the Roman Catholic Church, whose
authority is based in Rome, and, hence, in a foreign state. Second,
their adherence to Irish Nationalism resulted in an allegiance to the
Irish Free State and its successor, the Republic of Ireland, whose
capital is also foreign, thereby further undermining obedience to the
laws of the Parliament of Northern Ireland. It was not uncommon to
find the extreme Unionists reconciling these two loyalties to a single
one: the immediate allegiance to the governments in the Republic,
which, in turn, was dominated by the Church in Rome.'2 5
Unionist Governments endeavoured to contain subversion as a mat-
ter of practicality, although the measures adopted indicate an extreme
repression intended to eradicate it from the province. Firstly,
parliamentary opposition and the possibility of that being
democratically transformed into control of the Northern Ireland
Parliament was curtailed by a number of measures. All candidates for
the parliamentary seats (as well as local government offices) have to
subscribe to the promissory oath and, thus, indicate an allegiance not
-24 See Israel, Elfbrandt v. Russell: The Demise of the Oath?, 1966 Sup. CT. REV.
193, for review of the loyalty oath programmes in the United States.
125 This concept of duality of allegiance is explained in R. ROSE, supra note 12,
at 218-46. M. FARRELL, supra note 14, gives many examples of unscrupulous use of
the "Home Rule means Rome Rule" concept in his historical analysis. See also A.
BOYD, supra note 69. On the fear that Protestants have shown of "government from
Rome" via Dublin, see G. BELL, supra note 20, and on the alienation of the Unionist
government from the Catholic Church, see J. CALLAGHAN, supra note 32, at 72, 97.
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only to Her Majesty's Government but also to the Northern Ireland
Government. 2 6 Furthermore, to prevent the prospect of migration
from the Irish Free State creating a majority of Catholic electors, the
qualifying period of residence in the province was raised, in 1928 to
three years,' 27 and in 1934 to seven years, s unless the voter was born
in Northern Ireland. Moreover, as was well documented, the consti-
tuencies were gerrymandered to make the prospect of control by the
minority community an impossibility.'2 9
Secondly, similar measures were taken to curtail the influx of
migrants from the South and to curb the employment of Catholics in
the North. The Safeguarding of Employment Act (NI) 1947 restricted
employment in the province to persons born there or who had been
"ordinarily resident" there for ten or twenty consecutive years following
the passage of the Act, or married to a person born in the province or
the child of such person.130 In the field of public employment, persons
who received employment from the Northern Ireland Government or a
local government had to subscribe to the promissory oath.' 3 '
The legal certainty which is necessary for the protection of civil
liberty was abrogated by the extreme measures directed against the
12s Promissory Oaths Act, 1923, 13 & 14 Geo. 5, c. 7 (N.I.).
121 Representation of People Act, 1928, 18 & 19 Geo. 5, c. 24, § 4 (N.I.).
12s Representation of People Act, 1934, 24 & 25 Geo. 5, c. 7, § 1 (N.I.). See also
Elections and Franchise Act, 1946, 10 Geo. 6, c. 8, § 10 (N.I.); Electoral Law Act,
1962, c. 14, § I (N.I); Electoral Law Act, 1969, c. 26, § 2 (N.I.).
129 The most comprehensive exposition of gerrymandering is contained in the
CAMPAIGN FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE, THE PLAIN TRUTH (1969), and in the CAMERON
REPORT, supra note 13, at 132-28.
130 The constitutionality of this statute was unsuccessfully challenged in Duffy v.
Ministry of Labour and National Insurance, [1962] N.I. 6, where in Lord MacDer-
mott, C.J., stated that the extraterritoriality of the legislation could not be admitted so
as to fetter the Northern Irish Parliament from enacting legislation to protect Ulster
workers. The court held that the "pith and substance" of the impugned legislation was
the protection of Ulster workers and not the regulation of the provision of services by
outside workers. Similarly, the landmark case of Gallagher v. Lynn, [1937] A.C. 863,
established that the "pith and substance" doctrine, when applied to a statute restric-
ting trade between Eire and Northern Ireland, justified regulation of external trade if
the "pith and substance" of the impugned legislation was regulation of activity within
Northern Ireland. In both cases the courts could arrive at such conclusions only by
completely ignoring the legislative history and societal context of the impugned legisla-
tion. Knowingly or unwittingly the courts buttressed, rather than scrutinized, the com-
petence of the Northern Irish Parliament (Stormont) to enact discriminatory measures,
the real "pith and substance" being the entrenchment of Unionist hegemony. See also
Calvert, Gallagher v. Lynn Re-examined-A Legislative Fraud?, 1972 PUB. L. 11.
1 Promissory Oaths Act, 1923, 13 & 14 Geo. 5, c. 7 (N.I.).
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extra-parliamentary oppositional political and paramilitary activities;
the most pernicious piece of legislation was the notorious Special
Powers Acts, 1922-43.132 In the first place, there were numerous ex-
ceedingly vague offenses created by the Act and regulations so that it
was impossible for any group opposed to the policies of the Unionist
Government to carry out an oppositional campaign with the knowledge
that such freedom was secure from interference. For example, one
sedition-type offense made it criminal to "spread false reports or make
false statements."' 3 3 There were four separate incitement-type offenses
created by the regulations, one of which included provisions making it
a crime to do "any act calculated or likely to cause mutiny, sedition or
disaffection . . . among the civilian population."' 3 4 Second, and more
important, there were vested in the Civil Authority and Home Affairs
Minister very wide powers to proscribe the publication and possession
of newspapers, films, records, and virtually any form of document.1 s
131 See note 96 supra. For a critique of the Special Powers Acts, see NATIONAL
COUNCIL FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES (NCCL), REPORT OF A COMMISSION OF INQUIRY AP-
'POINTED TO EXAMINE THE PURPOSE AND EFFECT OF THE CIVIL AUTHORITIES (SPECIAL
POWERS) ACTS (NORTHERN IRELAND) 1922 & 1933 (1936). See also Edwards, supra
note 98, for analysis of the effect of the Acts between 1944 and 1954.
I's Reg. No. 25(a), 1922 12' Geo. 5, c. 5. See also Reg. No. 25, 25(b), 25(c).
These were revoked by Reg. No. 147 STAT. R. & 0. N.I. (1949).
"34 Reg. No. 16, 1922, 12 Geo. 5. c. 5. See note 133 supra. See also Reg. No. 26,
1922, 12 Geo. 5, Reg. No. 137 STAT. R. & 0. N.I. (1943) which promulgated Reg.
No. 26(A), 1922, 12 Geo. 5 and Reg. No. 147 STAT. R. & 0. N.I. (1949) revoking
Reg. No. 26 & 26(A) Reg. No. 8(2), 1922, 12 Geo. 5, c. 5, and Reg. No. 179 STAT. R.
& 0. N.I. (1954) were revoked by Reg. No. 40 STAT. R. & 0. N.I. (1971) which pro-
mulgated Reg. No. 8(1), 1922, 12 Geo. 5, c. 5. For offences relating to possession of
information about the police force or "of such a nature as is calculated to be or might
be directly or indirectly useful to persons hostile or opposed to the preservation of
peace," see Reg. No. 10, 1922, 12 Geo. 5, c. 5, Reg. No. 147 STAT. R. & 0. N.I.
(1949); Reg. No. 199, 1922, 12 Geo. 5, c. 5, STAT. R. & 0. N.I. (1956) which pro-
mulgated Reg. No. 26(1), 1922, 12 Geo. 5, c. 5; Reg. No. 27, 1922, 12 Geo. 5, c. 5, and
Reg. No. 58 STAT. R. & 0. N.I. (1930), which were revoked by Reg. No. 147 STAT. R. &
0. N.I. (1949); Reg. No. 24(A), 1922, 12 Geo. 5, c. 5, Reg. No. 35 STAT. R. & 0.
N.I. (1922).
I's The Civil Authority and Home Affairs Minister were empowered to ban the
publication of newspapers under Reg. No. 26, 1922, 12 Geo. 5, c. 5 and Reg. No. 137
STAT. R. & 0. N.I. (1943) which promulgated Reg. No. 26(A), 1922, 12 Geo. 5, c. 5.
These were revoked by Reg. No. 147 STAT. R. & 0. & N.I. (1949). The Minister was
empowered to prohibit the erection of monuments. Reg. No. 8(A), 1922, 12 Geo. 5, c.
5, Reg. No. 85 STAT. R. & 0. N.I. (1951). He was also empowered under the same
Reg. No. 26(A) to order the proscription of possessions of films and records. Reg. No.
58 STAT. R. & 0. N.I. (1930).
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Additionally there were powers to proscribe organizations,1 6 to order
curfews and censuses in particular areas,"3 7 to exclude individuals from
Northern Ireland,13 to curtail movement by issuing resident restriction
orders, 39 and to order the arrest for interrogation or internment of
suspects although they might not be suspected of having committed an
offense." 4 0 These powers were not subject to critical judicial scrutiny.
Instead the courts construed them to permit the exercise of the powers
136 Reg. No. 24(A) 1922, 12 Geo. 5, c. 5, Reg. No. 35 STAT. R. & 0. N.I.
(1922). These regulations were used to ban or proscribe both prohibited parties and
paramilitary groups. E.g., Sinn Fein, the Republican party, was proscribed by Reg.
No. 199 STAT. R. & 0. N.I. (1956), the Republican Clubs, proscribed by Reg. No. 42
STAT. R. & 0. N.I. (1967), and the I.R.A., proscribed by Reg. No. 24(A), 1922, 12
Geo. 5, c. 5.
"' The Civil Authority was empowered to order curfews under Reg. No. 1, 1922,
12 Geo. 5, c. 5, amended by Reg. No. 31 STAT. R. & 0. N.I. (1922) and Reg. No. 72
STAT. R. & 0. N.I. (1923), but revoked by Reg. No. 147 STAT. R. & 0. N.1. (1949)
and reintroduced as Reg. No. 19(1) by Reg. No. 199 STAT. R. & 0. N.I. (1956). He
was also authorised to order occupiers to post a list of occupants at each entrance.
Reg. No. 18(B), 1922, 12 Geo. 5, c. 5, Reg. No. 56 STAT. R. & 0. N.I. (1922), but
revoked'by Reg. No. 147 STAT. R. & 0. N.I. (1949).
131 Reg. No. l(A)(2), 1922, 12 Geo. 5, c. 5, Reg. No. 54 STAT. R. & 0. N.I.
(1940); Reg. No. I(B)(1), 1922, 12 Geo. 5, c. 5; Reg. No. 61 STAT. R. & 0. N.1.
(1940); Reg. No. 3(2), 1922, 12 Ceo. 5, c. 5, Reg. No. 18 STAT. R. & 0. N.I. (1972);
Reg. No. 37(1), 1922, 12 Geo. 5, c. 5, Rig. No. 16 STAT. R. & 0. N.I. (1957).
131 A general power was conferred upon the Home Affairs Minister to restrict
movement by order. Reg. No. 23(B), 1922, 12 Geo. 5, c. 5, Reg. No. 36 STAT. R. &
0. N.I. (1922), amended by Reg. No. 23(B)(1), Reg. No. 92 STAT. R. & 0. N.I.
(1940), but revoked by Reg. No. 147 STAT. R. & 0. N.I. (1949), and reintroduced as
Reg. No. 12(1), 1922, 12 Geo. 5, c. 5, Reg. No. 191 STAT. R. & 0. N.I. (1956). A
further power to exclude persons from areas is created by Reg. No. 23(A), 1922, 12
Geo. 5, c. 5, Reg. No. 36 STAT. R. & 0. N.I. (1922), but revoked by Reg. No. 147
STAT. R. & 0. N.1. (1949).
140 There were two forms of detention which could be directly authorised by the
Civil Authority or Home Minister. First, there was detention under Reg. No. 23,
1922, 12 Geo. 5, c. 5, Reg. No. 34 & 41 STAT. R. & 0. N.I. (1922), but revoked by
Reg. No. 147 STAT. R. & 0. N.I. (1949), and reintroduced as Reg. No. 15, 1922, 12
Geo. 5, c. 5, Reg. No. 48 STAT. R. & 0. N.I. (1950). This latter was revoked by Reg.
No. 187 STAT. R. & 0. N.I. (1951), and reintroduced as Reg. No. 11(2), 1922, 12
Geo. 5, c. 5, Reg. No. 191 STAT. R. & 0. N.I. (1956). Second, there was the power to
make internment orders under Reg. No. 23(B), 1922, 12 Geo. 5, c. 5, Reg. No. 36
STAT. R. & 0. N.I. (1922), amended by Reg. No. 41 STAT. R. & 0. N.I. (1922), and
Reg. No. 48 STAT. R. & 0. N.I. (1923). Reg. No. 23(B)(1), 1922, 12 Geo. 5, c. 5, was
created by Reg. No. 42 STAT. R. & 0. N.I. (1940), but revoked by Reg. No. 147 STAT. R.
& 0. N.J. (1949), and reintroduced as Reg. No. 12(1), 1922, 12 Geo. 5, c. 5, Reg. No.
191 STAT. R. & 0. N.I. (1956), and amended by Reg. No. 309 STAT. R. & 0. N.J.
(1971).
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where the Home Affairs Minister could proffer a rationale for such
use.14 1 In summary, these anti-subversion measures removed the legal
certainty essential to the establishment of fundamental freedoms and,
therefore, the legal protection of the -organization of extra-
parliamentary opposition.
The function of these measures served to perpetuate the organiza-
tion of the Northern Irish society. The Unionist Government, having
successfully defeated the Irish nationalists during disturbances suffered
by the nascent state, controlled the Northern Ireland Parliament, con-
solidating their monopoly of political power through the measures
described above. The Unionist Party, however, was dominated by the
small elite of the large landowners and industrialists whose privileges
depended, in the main, upon this continued hierarchical organization
of Northern Irish social and political institutions. 42 On the one hand,
the anti-subversive laws, by the fact of their existence, rendered the in-
feriority of the minority community political activities a fact of social
and political consciousness in Northern Ireland; this, in itself, is a fac-
tor which contributed to Catholic subjugation and obedience. Never-
theless, the unique feature of Northern Irish society is the failure of a
labor movement to emerge as a strong influence in social and political
life.' 43 The Unionist Party, which was dominated by the large lan-
downers and industrialists, maintained the hegemony of this elite over
the Protestant workers. So long as the union between Great Britain
and Northern Ireland remained under attack from the Catholics in the
North, who were aided by greater numbers of Catholics in the
Republic, there was a constant "clear and present danger" that the
Northern Ireland Government might be destroyed in a civil war or in-
surrection. In this way the permanent enactment of the Special Powers
Acts contributed to the maintenance of the social solidarity within the
Protestant community, and that solidarity meant the continued leader-
ship of the elite. However, the civil rights movement of the late 1960's
did not include among its aims the dissolution of the Northern Ireland
141 R. (O'Hanlon) v. Governor of Belfast Prison, [1922] 56 Ir.L.T.R. 170;
McEldowney v. Forde, [1969] 3 W.L.R. 179; Sills, The Uncertainty of Special Powers,
33 MOD. L. REV. 327 (1970).
142 See G. BELL, supra note 20, for the composition and interests of the Unionist
Party. See also M. FARRELL, supra note 14; J. HARBINSON, supra note 67; and R.
ROSE, supra note 12.
141 This is a recurring theme in Bell's historical analysis of Ulster Unionism. See
generally M. FARRELL, supra note 14, and R. ROSE, supra note 12.
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Government and posed a peculiar problem for the Unionist Govern-
ment. It threatened social solidarity in that it raised issues of civil
rights which were not concerned with the politics of partition, but
nevertheless threatened the traditional sectarian allegiances (Unionist
and Nationalist). It was this threat to the social solidarity within the
Protestant community which prompted the extreme reaction by the
Unionist Government.
The critique of these measures offered by the liberal constitutional
theorists focuses almost exclusively on Special Powers Acts, overlooking
the measures taken to restrict employment and participation in
parliamentary politics. 144 Such a critique distinguishes between the ex-
istence of the draconian measures which can be examined and criticized
for their breadth and vagueness, and the application of the
measures. Commentators point out that, notwithstanding the extreme
deprivation of civil liberty, the actual use of these measures was infre-
quent, usually during periods of rebellion by the I.R.A. and,
therefore, necessary to preserve the Northern Ireland Government
from being destroyed by the Nationalist menace."4 At the same time,
infrequent usage is also evidence that the Unionist Governments, on
the whole, practiced tolerance consistent with that found in liberal
democratic states where there is no minority community providing suc-
cor to insurrection." 46 This view slights the permanent nature of the
Special Powers Acts, and, by focusing on the use of these powers only
during "emergencies," ignores its principal function of preserving
solidarity within the Protestant community. If liberal constitutional
analyses are applied to the measures directed against the civil rights
movements, then they must admit either that the Unionist Government
was intolerant or that the marches constituted subversive activities.
The latter notion was dismissed by the Cameron Report which also
criticized the Unionist Home Affairs Minister for abusively exercising
his powers (and, by implication, for exercising intolerance)."17 The
liberal constitutional critique, by overlooking the principal function of
'44 See, e.g., Palley, supra note 3; H. CALVERT, supra note 10; Newark, The
Constitution of Northern Ireland, in DEVOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT (D. Neill ed.
1950); and Shearman, Constitutional and Political Development of Northern Ireland,
in ULSTER SINCE 1800: A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SURVEY (T. Moody & J. Beckett
eds. 1954).
'41 See Edwards, supra note 98 at 18; H. CALVERT, supra note 10, at 384.
146 Id.; Palley, supra note 3, at 400-11.
4' CAMERON REPORT, supra note 13, at 146, 148, 157-67.
[Vol. 10:251
NORTHERN IRELAND
the Special Powers Acts is, therefore, inaccurate and, perhaps more
importantly, obfuscates that function.
When we turn to the prospect of establishing a Bill of Rights in
Northern Ireland, these observations must guide the definition of the
issues and choice of solutions. The liberal critique, which we briefly
outlined above, suggests that there are no objections to vesting in the
executive wide discretion to devise and employ counter-subversive laws
and regulations. We have demonstrated that this approach inevitably
led successive Unionist Governments into the use of such measures to
secure the hegemony of the elite within their own party. There is no
evidence to suggest that the present United Ulster Unionist Council
(UUUC) would depart from the approach. If these wide powers were
vested in a coalition Executive, there is a very real prospect that the
opposing views of the Unionists and SDLP over public order (including
subversion) would precipitate crises, rather than promote stability in
the government. The problems in Northern Ireland will be exacer-
bated rather than resolved by re-introducing the approach which vests
wide powers in the executive.
A Bill of Rights might be drafted to curtail the devolved
parliament's powers to repress subversive activity. This is best achieved
by the Public Order laws, which we have previously suggested be in-
corporated into the schedule of the Bill of Rights, enumerating with
precision the measures which may be taken by parliament and the ex-
ecutive. Furthermore, such legislation should draw a clear distinction
between legitimate political activity, which includes the display of flags
and emblems and the propagation of nationalist opinions, and all
paramilitary organization and ancillary activities which might be pro-
scribed along the lines of section 2 of the Public Order Act of 1936.148
It must be emphasized that this proscription should be provided in
general form and there should be no provision which empowers the ex-
ecutive to proscribe particular paramilitary organizations by name or
description. If this approach is adopted, then the "territorial integrity"
restriction in Article 10(2) of the European Convention must be drop-
ped and the general provision of Article 17 is restricted, as it should
be, to actions which interfere with the rights and freedom of others. It
should be explicitly provided that no further restriction can be in-
troduced under Article 17 or, alternatively, it should be deleted
altogether from the Bill of Rights.
1" Public Order Act, 1936, 1 Edw. 8 & 1 Geo. 6, c. 6.
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The effect of these suggestions is that the basis upon which the Bill
of Rights is established constitutes one of tolerance by the Protestant
community of the minority community's propagation of its nationalist
or irredentist ideas. More importantly, organizations formed in that
community with the aim of democratically bringing about the
reunification of Ireland must likewise be tolerated. This tolerance
creates an extra-parliamentary opposition with the avowed aim of
dissolving the Northern Ireland Government, but such an opposition
must be tolerated if the Bill of Rights is to secure the necessary
political power desired by the minority community. As we have
previously suggested, this tolerance is diametrically opposed to the
solidarity of the Protestants, since it is the intolerance towards the
minority's propagation of nationalism which creates the "clear and pres-
ent danger" to the union between Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
At the present time, the establishment of a Bill of Rights would not
secure this tolerance, unless it was accompanied with the concomitant
suppression of the extreme Protestants.
IV. EMERGENCY POWERS1
4 9
Providing for state measures to restore and maintain order in times
of public emergencies poses the most difficult issue for constitutional
theory in the field of civil liberty. On the one hand, the rule of law, if
it is to control the governmental response to an emergency, must dic-
tate that governments explain their decision to declare a public
emergency and their actions thereunder in any proceedings instituted
in the ordinary courts of law. This is the rational element in positivist
conception of law. 50 On the other hand, the decision to restore or
maintain order by declaring a public emergency is regarded as the act
of the sovereign, especially where it is effected by parliament enacting
emergency legislation. The sovereign is not subordinate to the rule of
law and is not obliged to explain this decision in a court of law.'
5 1
149 On the recent use of emergency powers in Northern Ireland see generally P.
HILLYARD, supra note 1, and CMND. No. 5847, supra note 6. For an examination of
the recurring use of internment in this century in Northen Ireland see J. MCGUFFIN,
INTERNMENT (1973). On the use of the military acting "in aid to the civil power" see
B. NARAIN, PUBLIC LAW IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1975). On the reform of emergency
powers, see D. Twining et al., Emergency Powers: A Fresh Start, Fabian Society Tract
No. 416, London (1922).
1'o F. NEUMANN, THE DEMOCRATIC AND THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE 23-28 (1957).
1"I A. DICEY, supra note 91, at 229-32; and F. NEUMANN, supra note 150, at 26.
Greene v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs [1942] A.C. 284.
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Even where the response to a situation is by the promulgation of
subordinate legislation, the view predominantly adopted is that the ex-
ecutive should be subject only to the control of the parliament, thereby
rendering the instrument beyond the competence of judicial
scrutiny.1 5 2 This is the political element in the law in that the initiation
of the law is controlled at its source. However, once constitutional
theory admits that it is exclusively for the sovereign to promulgate the
emergency, even under subordinate legislation, then the corollary is
also conceded, namely that the executive also decides when it is
restricted from using its emergency powers. In short, the restriction
upon the government's declaring an emergency to encroach upon fun-
damental freedoms is political rather than rational. So long as con-
stitutional theory concedes this absolute sovereignty to respond to the
emergency, there is a fatal contradiction between the rule of law as the
basis of protecting human rights and the absolutism of the sovereign.
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms has introduced a qualified concept of public
emergencies. First, Article 15 specifies that emergencies arise in "time
of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation, " 53
which provision, although exceedingly general, nonetheless imposes a
definition. Second, the determination of when an emergency arises is
not left exclusively to the sovereign, but will be reviewed by the Euro-
pean Commission and Court. 5 4 Nevertheless, the interpretation of
these provisions has construed public emergencies to include the state
of apprehended emergency as well as actual emergency.155 Further-
more, national governments have been permitted a "margin of ap-
preciation"'156 to determine when there is an emergency. The scrutiny
12 R. v. Halliday, [1817] A.C. 260; Liversidge v. Anderson [1942] A.C. 206. See
also Keeton, Liversidge v. Anderson, 5 MOD. L. REV. 162 (1942); Heuston, Liversidge
v. Anderson in Retrospect, 86 L. Q. REv. 33 (1970).
1"3 For a general discussion of Article 15 see P. WALLINGTON & J. MCBRIDE,
supra note 8, at 90-91 See also A. ROBERTSON, supra note 121, at 110-17.
154 Lawless v. Ireland, [1961] Y. B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 438, 472-74
(Eur. Ct. of Human Rights).
155 "Greek" Case, [1969] Y. B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 42 (Eur. Comm.
on Human Rights). See also A. ROBERTSON, supra note 121, at 39-41, 111-12.
116 In Lawless this concept is stated to be:
The concept behind this doctrine is that Article 15 has to be read in the con-
text of the rather special subject matter with which it deals: the respon-
sibilities of a Government for maintaining law and order in times of war or
public emergency threatening the life of the nation. The concept of the
margin of appreciation is that a Government's discharge of these respon-
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undertaken by the Commission and the Court respects, to some extent,
the positivist element in the decision.
The consequences of a government taking action pursuant to Arti-
cle 15 is that it may "take measures derogating from its obligations
under [the] Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies
of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with
its other obligations under international law."" 7 Although the govern-
ment may be obliged to justify its action as "strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation," the provision for derogation in an
emergency allows the government temporarily to abrogate these fun-
damental freedoms and, perhaps in some instances, to restrict the ex-
tent to which a section of the community can organize extra-
parliamentary opposition in order to initiate constitutional reforms. In
short, the provision for derogation is also a license rationally to repress
the opposition. The key issue is who determines whether the suppres-
sion is "rational" and consequently legitimate.
In Northern Ireland, as we have already observed, the Unionist
Governments invoked their emergency powers under the Special
Powers Acts to combat the periodic military campaigns of the I.R.A.
Additionally, the Northern Ireland Parliament enacted the Emergency
Powers Act (NI) of 1926.158 This was invoked in response to the
general strike in 1926 and on two other occasions.' 59 The determina-
tion that there was an emergency warranting the use of such measures
was always the exclusive determination of the executive, and it is clear
that the use of such powers has been found to be consistent with the
provisions in Article 15 of the European Convention on at least one oc-
sibilities is essentially a delicate problem of appreciating complex factors and
of balancing conflicting considerations of the public interest; and that, once
the Commission or the court is satisfied at least on the margin of the powers
conferred by Article 15, then the interest which the public itself has in effec-
tive Government and in the maintenance of order justifies and requires a
decision in favor of the legality of the Government's appreciation.
Lawless v. Ireland, supra note 154, at 408.
157 Art. 15(1) However, no derogation is permitted from articles 3, 4 (paragraph
1), 7 and 2 so far as it related to deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, per art.
15(2).
18 16 & 17 Geo. 5, c. 8. For comments on this act see H. CALVERT, supra note
10, at 386-87, and Palley, supra note 3, at 403.
'1 Reg. No. 158, STAT. R. & 0. N.I. (1966), and Reg. No. 317, STAT. R. & O
N.I. (1970).
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casion-namely, the re-introduction of internment on August 9,
1971.160
Nevertheless, it is also true that the minority community did not
accept the validity of this executive determination of a public
emergency, and the SDLP thereafter abstained from further participa-
tion in the proceedings of the Northern Ireland Parliament. Whether
the SDLP is "wrong" in its judgment about the invocation of the
emergency powers is not the issue; rather, it is the discrepancy between
the Unionists, on the one hand, and the SDLP and the Catholic com-
munity on the other. What is required for a successful solution of the
problem created by the provision for derogation in emergencies (that
is, if stability of a coalition government constitutes the criteria for suc-
cess) is a mechanism which reserves consensus between the coalition
parties in the exercise of the powers permitting the derogation. There
is a very serious risk that if such powers are vested in one minister or
member of the executive, his decision to invoke the powers will divide
the executive and compel one section to abstain from participation.
Similarly, if jurisdiction to review this decision is vested in a judicial
body, perhaps a constitutional court, in the coalition composition of
the court may similarly divide and, again, there is a substantial pros-
pect that one or more of the judges will withdraw from participation
in the further proceedings. Thus, the power to initiate emergency
measures introduces political instability into the constitutional settle-
ment.
The doctrine of necessity injects a further complication into the
problem.' 6 1 Although the withdrawal from participation of one party
from the government, or of a judge from a court, might appear to
render the continued operation of the government and courts in-
congruous or incompatible with the constitution and, hence, un-
constitutional, legal positivism presupposes the necessity for a sovereign
to continue existing. The temporary breakdown in the government's
proceeding in conformity with the provisions of the constitution in
times of emergency does not automatically mean the abolition of the
sovereign power in that state. 62 Instead, the sovereignty is assumed by
those still exercising the powers and, ipso facto, those measures iden-
'60 REPORT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 108.
This finding has been referred to the European Court of Human Rights for recon-
sideration and adjudication by the Irish Government.
161 A.G. of Republic v. Ibrahim, [1964] Cyprus Law Reports 195.
162 Id.
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tified as valid law in the circumstances.' 63 By invoking the doctrine of
necessity, the sovereign, which is in ordinary times identified with the
procedures provided in the constitution, is characterized by those still
operating the apparatus of the state, the legislative, executive and
judicial functions. The abstention by members of the coalition ex-
ecutive or constitutional court would not prevent the declaration of
emergency; rather, it would modify the form of legitimacy.
164
One possible mechanism for taking the initiative out of the coali-
tion executive would be to vest the authority to initiate the emergency
measures in the police and local authorities - that is, along the lines
of the procedure provided for in the Public Order Act of 1936, section
3(2).161 As we also have already observed, such a procedure would be
highly unacceptable to the minority community without the establish-
ment of some form of control of the police at the community level. It
is this body which is perhaps the most appropriate for initiating a
recommendation to the local authority for introducing emergency
measures in a limited geographic area for a period not exceeding three
months. If the emergency extends throughout the province, the in-
troduction of the necessary measures would require a wide consensus in
Northern Ireland and, in view of the divergent interpretations of the
situation in August 1971, this procedure prevents precipitous action
without such a consensus. At the same time, the final decision to promul-
163 R. (Childers) v. Officer Commanding, Portobello Barracks, Dublin, and
Adjutant-General of the Forces of the Irish Provisional Government, [1923] 1 I.R. 5.
Note expecially O'Connor, M.R., at 13 and 14.
164 Even a "provisional government" has been deemed an acceptable form of
sovereign power for the purpose of executing dissidents during an emergency. R.
(Childers) v. Officer Commanding, Portobello Barracks, [1923] 1 I.R. at 14. See also
R. v. Allen, [1921] 1 I.R. 241.
161 The Public Order Act, 1936, 1 Edw. 8 & 1 Geo. 6, c. 6, § 3(2):
If at any time the chief officer of police is of opinion that by reason of par-
ticular circumstances existing in any borough or urban district or in any part
thereof the powers conferred on him by the last foregoing subsection will not
be sufficient to enable him to prevent serious public disorder being occasion-
ed by the holding of public processions in that borough, district or part, he
shall apply to the council of the borough or district for an order prohibiting
for such period not exceeding three months as may be specified in the ap-
plication the holding of all public processions or of any class of public proces-
sion so specified either in the borough or urban district or in that part
thereof, as the case may be, and upon receipt of the application the council
may, with the consent of a Secretary of State, make an order either in terms
of the application or with such modifications as may be approved by the
Secretary of State.
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gate the emergency measures is subject to political control via the local
body responsible for controlling the police, the local authority, and the
regional assembly or parliament upon the minister or ministers agree-
ing to make the necessary statutory instrument.
This solution will appear unattractive to those who consider as
paramount both the need for a consensus, an impediment to dealing
with an emergency, and for vesting such powers in the central govern-
ment. It is important to bear in mind that the doctrine of necessity
most likely extends to the situation where the local authorities might
refuse their co-operation in declaring the recommendation of the
emergency measures desired by the executive and, if the courts agree
that the situation constitutes a public emergency, they may ignore the
elaborate procedures. In reality it is impossible to institute constitu-
tional procedures for regulating the declaration of a public emergency
when those in the central government are unwilling to subordinate
themselves to impartial scrutiny and the courts are similarly unwilling
to impose the supremacy of those procedures.
V. CONCLUSION
The active proponents of a Bill of Rights in Northern Ireland have
endeavored to secure constitutional protection of fundamental
freedom so that the organization of extra-parliamentary opposition will
not be diminished by the government in that province. Prior to the in-
troduction of direct rule in 1972, the campaign, spearheaded prin-
cipally by the NICRA, linked the campaign for the Bill of Rights to
the struggle for civil rights by the minority community. The principal
functions of such a Bill would have been to entrench legal protection
of the fundamental freedoms which permit the minority community to
initiate the debate over certain issues and, thus, a limited form of
power over a system of the party government while securing such
legislative reforms from later repeal. The campaign for a Bill of Rights
has expanded in that it now appears that there is also a desire in the
Protestant community constitutionally to protect the fundamental
freedoms so that it too may initiate the debate over certain constitu-
tional issues. It is also important to recall that the civil rights move-
ment, although its aims sought equality for the Catholic community,
was not exclusively drawn from the minority community, and such a
movement inevitably erodes the traditional sectarian boundaries in
political parties. The protection of those civil liberties which permit
such a campaign will undoubtedly contribute to the progressive
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political development in the province, notwithstanding the transient
disruption to the stability of extant parties and party allegiances.
The proponents of a Bill of Rights, unfortunately, sometimes
assume that consensus over governmental institutions is either irrele-
vant to the establishment of a Bill of Rights or that once a Bill is
enacted, the consensus will subsequently emerge.
166 We have contend-
ed that the opposite is the case, and that it is crucial that the pro-
ponents of the Bill examine the societal institutions necessary to ensure
that there is a basis for tolerance by both communities of each other
and toward facilitating the development of cross-sectarian tendencies.
First, the existence of a coalition executive is necessary but, as we have
seen, it is insufficient for the protection of fundamental freedoms.
More important, without the requisite consensus in other areas, the ex-
ecutive inevitably will be brought into the controversy over the func-
tioning of other institutions in society, especially the police, and in-
stability will ensue. Second, there must be some consensus over the
police and judiciary, as both will be responsible for administering and
construing the laws that protect and restrict these freedoms. As it is
accepted that the administration of such laws should be subject to
political control analagous to ministerial responsibility, we have sug-
gested that there should be established some form of community con-
trol of the police which would institute direct political responsiblity at
the local level. This would also have the important advantage of gain-
ing the acceptance of the police in the minority community. Never-
theless, this suggestion undoubtedly would be bitterly opposed by those
extreme Protestants who identify the continued central responsibility
for public order law with the suppression of republicanism and subver-
sion and, hence, the maintenance of the union with Great Britain and
Northern Ireland. In short, although major police reform is necessary
166 This is the position of the SDLP, the Alliance Party, the Unionist Party of
Northern Ireland, and the Northern Ireland Labour Party as indicated by the NOR-
THERN IRELAND CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION REPORT 129 (1975). NICRA has
taken the same position. NORTHERN IRELAND CIVIL RIGHTS ASSOCIATION, BILL OF
RIGHTS (1975). For a critique of the NICRA position, see D. Lowry & R. Spjut,
Loopholes and Liberties- The NICRA Bill of Rights, FORTNIGHT REV. (Belfast), May
23, 1975, at 5; for the NICRA reply, see Letters to the Editor, FORTNIGHT REV.
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before a Bill of Rights can be administered in Northern Ireland, such
measures will be most difficult to institute. Finally, there must be
reform of the judiciary in order to secure the minority community's
confidence in its interpretation of the Bill of Rights. Perhaps the most
appropriate model is the tripartite court which operated in Cyprus.'
Those proponents of the Bill of Rights who suggest that the Euro-
pean Convention should be the model must recognize its serious limita-
tions in the context of Northern Ireland. The express declaration in
law that the fundamental freedoms shall be recognized and protected
is no doubt necessary, but it is far from sufficient. The law governing
public meetings and processions, as we have seen, cannot be left to the
interstitial methods of judicial development because that will not pro-
vide the ncessary legal certainty which is crucial to the protection of
those organizing extra-parliamentary opposition on major constitu-
tional issues. Such an approach might induce stability into the con-
frontation between government and opposition. Moreover, there is no
certainty in the field of subversion, which if subsumed under the
heading of public order may itself be subverted or emasculated by the
regional government. Recent history in the province amply documents
the need for extreme caution in this area and we suggest that no provi-
sion be made to counter the opposition to the union between Great
Britain and Northern Ireland. This suggestion also requires recon-
sideration of the "territorial integrity" restriction in Article 10(2) of the
European Convention. Finally, an examination of the problem of
emergencies suggests two related conclusions. Some crises might be
dealt with under the procedure which we suggest, but in a major con-
frontation between the communities, force will undoubtedly prevail
and find legitimacy in the doctrine of necessity. Constitutions and Bills
of Rights, however, are not drafted to govern the conduct of civil war.
'67 CYPRUS CONST. (1960) arts. 131-53.
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